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Governments continue to introduce, or to
explore the introduction of, environmental taxes
and charges because of their cost-effectiveness
in reducing environmental impacts. However,
sometimes, these taxes and charges are also
associated with disproportionate impacts on
low-income households, which can make them
both politically unpopular and socially unjust.
This report describes research that sought first
to estimate the effects on low-income
households of different environmental taxes and
charges, and then, where they were
disproportionate, to model how they could be
reduced. The research investigated four areas in
which environmental taxes and charges have
been either introduced or are under discussion:
the use by households of energy, water and
transport, and the household generation of
waste.
It became apparent early on in the research
that the effects on low-income households of
environmental taxes and charges in these areas
were very different, so they will be discussed
briefly in turn, before some more general
conclusions are drawn.
Household energy use
Emissions from UK households of carbon
dioxide, which is the greenhouse gas most
responsible for climate change, are increasing.
This is obviously problematic from the point of
view of the desire of the UK government to
reduce these emissions. However, the
government has ruled out the imposition of
taxes on household energy use, which could
reduce household emissions of carbon dioxide.
This is because of the perceived effect of such
taxes on low-income households and,
specifically, on those in fuel poverty (a situation
in which a household would need to spend
more than 10 per cent of its income to maintain
an adequate level of warmth). The research
investigated whether low-income households
could in fact be satisfactorily compensated for
such a tax through the benefits system.
The research early established that there is
enormous variation in household energy use
within income deciles (groups of 10 per cent of
households ranked by income, where Decile 1
contains the 10 per cent of households with
lowest incomes, etc.). The variation in carbon
emissions is not as great, but is still very
substantial. It also emerged that poor
households pay substantially more per unit of
energy than rich households. A carbon tax
imposed equally on rich and poor households,
without any compensation for poor households,
would therefore be very regressive and would
add to the unfair price burden these households
are already experiencing. A variety of ways of
compensating poor households was explored,
using means-tested benefits, child benefit,
adjustments to pensioners’ Winter Fuel
Allowance (WFA) and varying the rate of
carbon tax.
It was found that, for the lowest decile, all
the tax-plus-compensation packages are
progressive on average (that is, the average
household is a net gainer). The same is true for
Deciles 2 and 3, except in respect of one
scenario. These results show that it is possible to
make a household carbon tax progressive for
the average household in the lowest deciles.
However, the enormously skewed
distribution of energy consumption within the
income deciles means that the average result
conceals great differences in net gains and losses
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within each decile. In fact, none of the
investigated compensation packages manages
to reduce the proportion of losing Decile 1
households much below 20 per cent. The
conclusion is that, although redistributing the
revenues from a carbon tax through means-
tested benefits would certainly be progressive
overall, and would bring some households out
of fuel poverty, no way of effecting such a
redistribution was found that would not also
worsen fuel poverty for those who are already
most badly affected by it. This makes
introducing a carbon tax on household energy
use politically problematic at best, and probably
politically infeasible.
An alternative approach to the issue would
be to introduce incentives for non-fuel-poor
households to introduce cost-effective energy-
efficiency measures. A scheme was outlined
whereby, starting with the highest-value houses
in each region, households would be asked to
have an energy audit of their house carried out.
A ‘climate change surcharge’ would be imposed
on households that failed to implement cost-
effective energy-efficiency measures identified
by the audit within a year. The same approach
could be adopted when householders move into
a new home, by imposing a surcharge on Stamp
Duty if audit-identified, cost-effective energy-
efficiency measures were not installed within a
certain time after the move.
The scheme would effectively abolish fuel
poverty, could achieve carbon savings of four
million tonnes of carbon (mtc) over ten years
and save households nearly £20 billion net
present value for an investment of £6.4 billion. It
would also eventually permit a non-regressive
carbon tax to be imposed, which could militate
against the growth of household carbon
emissions in the future. Few other public
policies have such a positive overall generation
and distribution of economic, social and
environmental benefits. The fact that such a
scheme currently seems not to be considered
politically feasible suggests that the public and
political will to mitigate climate change is not
yet very powerful.
Household use of water
There is a strong environmental case for
universal water metering, particularly in
southern and eastern England, regions that are
already making unsustainable use of their water
resources and where the situation is expected to
get worse because of population shifts and
climate change. There are also arguments
against water metering, one of which is that it
can lead to disproportionate costs for low-
income households (i.e. is regressive). However,
a recent international comparison of water
charging found that, in England, it is more
regressive and more burdensome on low-
income households than in any other industrial
country examined. It is therefore not true either
that metering is per se more regressive than non-
metered tariffs, or that the UK’s present system
of water charging is equitable. The
distributional impact depends on the detail of
the tariff.
At present, there are two methods of paying
for water in the UK. Most households pay a bill
based partly on a standing charge and partly on
the rateable value of the property. The
alternative is to be metered. Universal metering
could be implemented in the UK through a
variety of different tariffs, each with different
distributional implications, ranging from an
viii
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equal charge for all households (at least for a
given water company), which would increase
the regressivity of water charging (its
disproportionate impact on low-income
households), to having a lower tariff for those
on benefits, giving a ‘free’ allowance of water to
some households, or varying the tariff by an
amount related to Council Tax, which could
make low-income households better off. These
are some of the options explored by this
research. All the progressive options involve on
average a redistribution of income from better
off to less well off households.
The distributional effect of 11 alternative
tariff designs was examined with three
politically important variables in mind: the
average effect on low-income households; the
effect on high-water-using, low-income
households; and the overall redistributive effect
(i.e. the transfer from richer to poorer
households). The first major result of the
research was that all the metered tariffs
investigated were less regressive than the
present tariffs, on average making those in the
lowest-income group better off. In addition, all
but one of the investigated options was also
progressive for the next income group (those
with incomes of £10,000–20,000). There is
therefore no basis for supposing that switching
to metering will, on average, make low-income
households worse off. All the options
investigated actually make them better off on
average, some quite substantially so.
Second, there is no tariff that does not make
6 per cent or more of the lowest-income
households worse off by more than £1 per week.
These will be the high-water-consuming
households in this income group. For some of
them, their high water use will reflect
discretionary rather than essential use and a
cutback in that use would reduce these extra
charges that they would pay under metering.
Where their high water use is essential, this is
likely to be because of medical reasons and it
should be possible to make special
arrangements to make rebates of some charges
through the benefits system. In these two ways,
it is likely that the great majority of low-income
households would be able to reduce any extra
charges they would face under the metering
tariffs.
Third, the tariffs vary considerably in the
degree of redistribution from richer to poorer
that they bring about (as noted above, all are
redistributive in this direction to some extent).
Which of these tariff options is ‘best’
depends on political perspective. However, the
research showed clearly that water metering
does not need to have regressive effects.
It is hoped that, should universal metering
be adopted in the UK, in some regions or as a
whole, such detailed tariff design issues will get
adequate consideration, so that the change does
not have social effects that were not intended.
Household use of transport
Traffic growth in the 1990s was lower than is
expected for the period to 2010 because the
annual increase in fuel duties from 1993 made
petrol and diesel prices rise much faster than
inflation and suppressed the growth in traffic
that would have otherwise taken place. Because
of the freeze in fuel duty since 1999, which is
officially projected to continue for the rest of the
decade, fuel prices are falling in real terms.
Transport is the only sector of the UK
economy that has increased its emissions of
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carbon dioxide since 1990. Thanks to increasing
fuel efficiency, which offset the relatively small
growth in traffic during the 1990s, emissions
from road traffic did not increase substantially.
The main cause of the increase was growth in
domestic aviation.
Road transport emissions are expected to
grow 20–25 per cent over 2000–10, and further
beyond that date, without further measures to
restrain traffic growth. In addition, the
government is planning to permit the building
of additional runways to enable massive growth
in aviation.
Taxation of car use has been a particularly
sensitive issue since the fuel protests of autumn
2000. Petrol taxes are not regressive in aggregate
because poorer households are less likely to
have a car. Nearly a third of households do not
have a car and non-car-owning households are
concentrated among the lowest-income groups.
Nearly two-thirds of households in the lowest-
income quintile (the 20 per cent of households
with lowest incomes) do not have a car.
However, petrol taxes are regressive among
motorists.
The distributional impacts of several
possible measures to restrain the likely future
increase in emissions from transport were
investigated:
• increasing fuel duties and abolishing
vehicle excise duty (VED)
• increasing fuel duties and using the
money to subsidise public transport
• increasing fuel duties and using the
money to increase benefits
• reform of graduated vehicle excise duty
(VED)
• introducing a graduated car purchase tax
• congestion charging
• introducing domestic tradable quotas
(DTQs).
It was found that, if fuel duties were
increased, the most effective of the three ways in
terms of compensating low-income motorists
would be to abolish VED. Alternatively, a
graduated car purchase tax could replace
graduated VED, putting the entire cost at the
beginning. However, this would affect decisions
only about fuel efficiency, not about use.
The measure that has received the most
attention in the last few years is congestion
charging. A revenue-neutral congestion-
charging system would lead to a redistribution
of money from urban drivers to rural drivers.
Congestion charging that tackled traffic growth
would have to be revenue raising. Revenue
raising would also be necessary to fund the
improvements in public transport that would be
needed in order to cope with a modal switch
due to congestion charging. That would
inevitably mean that low-income urban
households would have to pay more if they
continued to drive.
The final approach considered was domestic
tradable quotas (DTQs), whereby every adult
resident would receive for free an equal number
of carbon units to cover their annual carbon
emissions, including private transport. Those
who used less than their entitlement would sell
their surplus units to others who wanted to use
more. If a DTQ system covered only the carbon
emissions from household energy use and
motoring, then it would be progressive, but
around 30 per cent of low-income households
x
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would be losers. However, if only emissions
from motoring and aviation were included, then
a smaller proportion of low-income households
would lose out, no more than 10–15 per cent.
The conclusion from this research is that a
system of DTQs covering motoring and aviation
would be an efficient and progressive way of
controlling carbon emissions from these sources.
In their absence, and in a political context that is
unfavourable for increased fuel duties, at least
partly because of their impact on low-income
motorists, revenue-raising congestion charges
could be used to control traffic growth, and
hence emissions, with low-income motoring
households being compensated through the
abolition of VED and further compensation
being given, if desired, through the benefits
system.
Household waste
Compared with most other EU member states,
the UK has a relatively low rate of recycling of
household waste and sends a relatively high
proportion to disposal in landfill. Under the
provisions of the EU Landfill Directive, this
situation will have to change radically in the
next ten years, with much less waste being sent
to landfill, in a context in which the quantity of
household waste continues to increase at about
3 per cent per year. Analysis in a report from the
Strategy Unit suggests that, in the absence of
waste-reduction measures, waste-disposal costs
are likely to double to £3.2 billion by 2020.
At present, households pay for waste
collection and disposal through the Council Tax.
Because the Council Tax is regressive (the
charge is proportionately greater for poor
households), increasing Council Tax to pay for
higher waste costs would also be regressive.
Moreover, the increase in charges would, like
the current flat-rate waste-disposal charge, do
nothing to incentivise householders either to
reduce their waste or to co-operate with
recycling schemes.
The Strategy Unit recommended that local
authorities should be able to introduce variable
waste charging, not least to provide an incentive
for both kinds of behaviour. Experience in other
countries has shown that it can be expected to
result in both waste reduction and an increase in
the separation of recyclables. A potential
concern about the introduction of variable waste
charging in the UK is that it might have a
disproportionate impact on poor households (as
would an increase in Council Tax), because the
generation of household waste bears little
relation to income and more affluent
households tend to recycle more, thereby
reducing their residual waste that would bear
the charge.
If waste charging was removed from Council
Tax by reducing the Council Tax for all
households by the same amount, this would be
progressive. If a revenue-neutral, variable,
weight-based charge was then introduced for all
households, and there was no waste reduction,
92 per cent of single-person households, and 76
per cent of two-person households, would be
better off, while most larger households would
be net losers. Clearly, more households of all
sizes would be losers if the charges were set at a
level to raise more revenue than is paid at
present through the Council Tax, in order to
cover the extra costs of increased recycling.
In the revenue-neutral case, with no source
reduction, effective compensation for the extra
waste-disposal costs could be given through the
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benefits system to the great majority of
households on means-tested benefits. The cost
of compensating all those up to the eightieth
percentile of waste generation is estimated at
£365 million per annum. This is comparable to
the £375 million that central government will
have to find to fund the increased costs of local
authority recycling (assuming that this is
funded through Council Tax with the same
proportion of central to local revenue as at
present).
Of course, all households could reduce their
waste-disposal costs by reducing the amount of
residual waste they generate, both by producing
less waste in the first place and by separating
out more waste for recycling. In fact, if variable
charging were to significantly reduce the
generation of household waste, then the
resulting lower waste-disposal charges could
offset partially or completely the extra benefits
needed to protect low-income households from
the initially higher variable waste charges that
have helped to bring it about.
General conclusions
In general, it is possible to solve the regressivity
problem sometimes associated with
environmental taxes and charges through either
tariff/charging design or a targeted
compensation scheme.
However, the consumption of key
environmental resources tends to be widely
distributed about the mean within a given
income group. This means that, under any
practicable compensation system (and assuming
no change in household behaviour), some low-
income households will end up as net losers
from any charging-plus-compensation scheme,
even when most low-income households end up
as significant gainers. In practice, households
will be able to change their behaviour in
response to charging (reducing the consumption
of the environmental resource in question), and
this should greatly reduce both the number and
extent of net losing low-income households.
Where reduction would result in real
hardship but the affected households could be
relatively easily identified (e.g. water use in
households with medical conditions), it should
be possible to make further special
arrangements to ensure that this is relieved.
Where the hardship affects larger numbers of
households that are harder to identify (e.g.
energy), it may be necessary to tackle the
underlying cause of the hardship (e.g. energy-
inefficient buildings) before pricing is used as an
instrument of policy.
In none of the areas studied will charging be
an adequate policy instrument by itself. A range
of other policy measures will be necessary to
provide alternative services or infrastructure
(e.g. transport, waste), increase capacity (e.g.
energy-efficiency installers) or address barriers
to more environmentally conserving behaviour
(e.g. lack of awareness/information in all areas).
However, it is not clear that the environmental
issues discussed in the report can be cost-
effectively addressed without the use of
environmental taxes and charges. It is hoped
that the insights in this report will help ensure
that, if they are introduced, they are designed so
that they do not have unintended social
consequences.
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1Introducing environmental taxes and
charges
This report is about the social implications of
environmental taxes and charges in relation to
four environmental issues – the household use
of energy, water and transport, and the
generation of waste.
Environmental taxes and charges are
examples of what are generally known as
‘economic instruments’ of environmental policy.
Other examples of such instruments are
emissions trading, which is briefly discussed in
Chapter 4, and deposit-refund systems, which
this report does not address. Environmental
economic policy instruments act by giving
direct financial incentives for more
environmentally conserving behaviour. The
1990s saw much debate about, and a certain
amount of introduction of, environmental
economic instruments, including environmental
taxes and charges (OECD, 1994; Ekins, 1999).1
However, it became apparent relatively early on
that two issues militated against the widespread
introduction of environmental taxes and charges
(OECD, 1996). One was their potential effect on
competitiveness – discussed in Ekins and Speck
(1998), but not further discussed here. The other
was their potential regressivity (having a more
than proportional impact on poorer households
compared to richer households). It is this issue
that provides the focus of this report.
This issue was examined in a UK context in
one of the final publications of the UK Round
Table on Sustainable Development (UKRTSD,
2000), which concluded:
It is important that perceived or potential equity
impacts should not result in proposed measures
being relegated to the ‘too difficult’ box. Where
there are serious potential impacts on vulnerable
groups a variety of possibilities are in principle
available to mitigate them.
(UKRTSD, 2000, p. 17)
The report gave a number of examples of
measures and approaches that could be used to
ensure that the introduction of environmental
taxes and charges was not regressive (e.g.
differential tariffs, compensatory measures
[UKRTSD, 2000, p. 18]). These approaches
provided the starting point for this research,
which sought to investigate their feasibility of
introduction and their effectiveness in
mitigating regressivity. First, however, it is
necessary to be clearer about the kinds of
environmental taxes and charges that are being
considered in this report.
Classifying environmental taxes and
charges
There are three different sorts of taxes/charges
that might be described as ‘environmental taxes
and charges’:
• upstream charges on resource use or
environmental emissions (where
upstream refers to a process early in the
production process, e.g. for energy, an oil
refiner or power generator)
• downstream charges on resource use
(where downstream refers to a final
consumer, most obviously, in this report,
households)
• downstream charges on environmental
emissions.
1 Introduction
2Green taxes and charges
The distinction is important because it has
implications for the responses to the taxes/
charges. Economic instruments work in two
ways: the response to the price signal can be
either to reduce the overall consumption of the
good in question or to substitute away from an
environmentally harmful version of the good
towards one that is less environmentally
harmful. The substitution can take place
upstream and downstream; the reduction in
consumption is a downstream response.
Table 1 gives examples of some the
possibilities for environmental taxes and
charges in the four areas studied in this report.
Those in italics are those that are discussed to
some extent in this report. It will be noted that
the focus of this report has been on downstream
environmental taxes and charges, because it was
desired to study the direct effects on
households. Not all theoretical options for
environmental taxes are practical possibilities.
For example, households cannot be charged for
emissions to water, because there is no feasible
way of identifying and measuring these for all
households.
Impacts of and responses to environmental
taxes and charges
Downstream consumers can respond to
upstream environmental charges only by
reducing their consumption of the goods that
the charges have made more expensive. This
will improve the environment only to the extent
that the environmental damage is associated
with this consumption.
In general, there are three main aspects to
the potential impact of an environmental tax or
charge, in particular its impact on poorer
households and the possible responses to it.
• The direct cash loss imposed by the tax or
charge assuming nothing else changes;
for example, if a household has an annual
income of £5,000 and an electricity bill of
£500, a 20 per cent energy tax will put that
up to £600 and raise the proportion from
10 per cent to 12 per cent of income – a
very significant increase. These are the
kinds of impacts that have been modelled
in detail in this report, together with
various schemes of compensation to
Table 1  Different types and examples of environmental taxes and charges
Upstream charge on resource Downstream Downstream charge on
use or environmental charge on environmental
emissions resource use emissions
Energy Carbon tax on primary energy Energy tax Energy tax differentiated by fuel
carbon content
Water Charges on abstractions or Metered water Not possible
emissions by water companies charges
Transport Carbon tax on petroleum Fuel tax Fuel tax or vehicle excise duty
producers differentiated by emissions
Waste Landfill tax Volumetric Differentiated waste charges
waste charges
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reduce the impact on low-income
households.
• The tax or charge will increase the cost of
each unit of the resource in question (by
20 per cent per unit of energy in the
example above). The incentive to
economise on the resource will have
increased significantly. The extent to
which consumers do or will respond to
environmental taxes and charges by
reducing their resource use is difficult to
calculate and predict. In this report, there
is some discussion of this issue, but, in all
the modelling of the financial impacts of a
tax or charge, it is assumed that
consumers do not change their
consumption of the resource in question.
This is unrealistic, because these impacts
can always be reduced by consuming less,
but it provides a worst-case example of
the financial impacts of environmental
taxes and charges.
• However, consumers on low incomes
may already be inclined to stint on the
use of essential resources, like energy, to
save money for other things, even to the
point of damaging their own health.
Environmental taxes will reinforce this
inclination, perhaps saving energy, but at
an unacceptable social cost. In these cases,
methods might be sought to provide an
incentive to increase the efficiency of
consumption, such that the quality of
service can be maintained or increased
with lower resource use. An example
studied in this report is giving incentives
to improve home insulation.
Scope of the report
This report investigates the impact on low-
income households of imposing environmental
taxes and charges on four activities that are
important for both health and the quality of life:
household use of energy, water and transport,
and disposal of waste. Each activity also causes
substantial environmental impacts, which the
imposition of environmental taxes is intended to
reduce. The report explores ways to mitigate the
impact of the taxes on low-income households,
or compensate them for it. Where this seems too
difficult, other incentive schemes for
environmental improvement are suggested.
Typically, environmental taxes and charges
are introduced as parts of sometimes complex
‘policy packages’. This research has studied in
detail the possible components of such packages
that might address any disproportionate
impacts of the taxes and charges on low-income
households, but has not gone in detail into other
considerations. The conclusions and
recommendations therefore do not purport to be
finished policy proposals, but more outlines of
approaches to the issues that seem promising
and worthy of further development.
Even so, much of the work carried out in this
research has been complex and technical. Much
more detail on how the work was carried out,
why particular approaches were adopted and
the full results are given in the full working
papers (Dresner and Ekins, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c,
2004d) produced by the research in each of the
areas considered: energy, water, transport and
waste.
While it is not the intention of this report to
argue the case for environmental taxes and
charges, there is in fact little evidence that any
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of the environmental issues discussed in this
report can be cost-effectively addressed, in a
context of economic growth, without use of the
price signal, which involves introducing
environmental taxes and charges. If a
government fails to use prices to give signals for
environmentally conserving behaviour, because
of the difficulties involved in addressing the
associated distributional issues, it is likely to
find both that the environmental problem will
prove intractable to other policy approaches,
because with rising incomes people’s
consumption of the resource will tend to
increase, and that the costs of environmental
improvement are higher than they need be. This
is why governments continue to be attracted to
environmental taxes and charges, despite their
challenges of implementation. The purpose of
this report is to give insights into how one of
those challenges, the problems relating to
regressivity, can be mitigated.
It became clear early on in the research that
the impacts on different income groups of
environmental taxes and charges would be very
different in the different areas in which they
were being applied. Any attempts to mitigate
them would also need to be specific to the area
under consideration. This report therefore turns
now to each of the issues in turn, giving some
background to each, and describing the research
methods that were used and the conclusions
that were drawn. The final chapter draws some
more general conclusions.
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UK households in 2000 produced 23.4 million
tonnes of carbon (mtc) emissions from their
direct use of fossil fuels (excluding transport)
and another 16.1 mtc if emissions from their use
of electricity are taken into account, giving a
total of 39.5 mtc (DEFRA, 2004a), or 27 per cent
of UK carbon emissions. Moreover, their energy
use and their carbon emissions are still growing.
Between 1990 and 2000, their direct fossil fuel
use grew by 13.3 per cent (an average annual
rate of 1.25 per cent per annum) and their
carbon emissions from this source by 8.8 per
cent (a lower rate of growth because of the shift
from coal to less carbon-intensive gas).
Household electricity use grew by 16.5 per cent
over 1990–2000. Carbon emissions from this use
of electricity fell, however, by 24.2 per cent,
because of the shift in power generation from
coal to gas. With household energy demand still
growing, and with limited possibilities for
further fuel switching in either power
generation or the direct household use of fossil
fuels, household carbon emissions are likely to
grow still further in future. A recent forecast
from Cambridge Econometrics (2004) suggests
that direct household emissions in 2010 will be
12 per cent higher than in 2000 and those from
household electricity use 2 per cent higher
(Cambridge Econometrics, 2004, Chapter 5, pp.
3, 12). This is obviously problematic in terms of
the government’s commitment to reduce carbon
emissions by 20 per cent from the 1990 value by
2010 and from a perspective that attaches any
kind of importance to reducing the emissions
that contribute to climate change.
In order to give incentives for households to
increase their energy efficiency, a number of
European countries have introduced household
carbon or energy taxes. The four Nordic
countries, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy
all introduced carbon taxes on household
energy during the 1990s.
However, the UK has a problem that is much
less serious in other European countries: fuel
poverty, a term used to describe a situation
whereby a household would need to spend
more than 10 per cent of its income on heating
in order to obtain an adequate level of warmth.
A major contributing factor to fuel poverty is
the poor thermal characteristics of the UK
housing stock. It is because of a desire not to
exacerbate fuel poverty that the present UK
government has made a repeated commitment
(e.g. HM Treasury, 2002) not to tax the
household use of energy.
At the same time, it is clear from research
into energy-efficiency schemes that much
investment in household energy efficiency is
cost-effective at current energy prices. Cost-
effectiveness is defined by the government as
payback within the lifetime of the measure with
a discount rate of 7 per cent. Figures from the
Energy Saving Trust (EST) suggest that there is a
huge potential for cost-effective measures that
are not being taken up (EST, 2001). However,
despite the potential financial gains, households
generally do not currently invest in the full
range of cost-effective energy-efficiency
technologies, for a range of reasons that have
been extensively studied and are now generally
well understood (EST, 2002). It is clear that
securing carbon emission reductions, rather
than growth, from households to 2010 and
beyond could result in net financial benefits
rather than costs, but that these benefits will not
materialise by themselves. Further policy
2 Household energy use
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measures will be needed to achieve them. It was
the purpose of this component of the project to
describe a policy approach that could have this
result and then keep carbon emissions stable, or
on a declining path, while seeking to ensure that
those on low incomes are not unfairly affected.
There are two aspects to that. The first is to
avoid regressivity (a situation in which, as
described above, those on lower incomes are left
proportionately worse off by a policy change
than those on higher incomes). The second is to
avoid worsening fuel poverty.
Approach
In contrast to the UK government’s position, the
initial hypothesis of the research was that a
carbon tax could be used to incentivise the
increase of household energy efficiency,
encouraging householders to implement
available cost-effective energy-efficiency
measures. Furthermore, because the tax would
fall on both the rich and the poor, the research
sought to show that poorer households could be
compensated by distributing the tax revenues,
through the benefit system or otherwise, in such
a way that the tax would not leave them worse
off financially and would therefore not increase
fuel poverty. However, because these
households would not be exempt from the tax,
the compensation mechanism would not
remove from them the tax’s incentive not to
waste energy.
Poverty in households is often explored by
dividing households into ten equally sized
groups, called deciles, according to their income.
Thus Decile 1 consists of the 10 per cent of
households with the lowest incomes, Decile 2
the 10 per cent with the next lowest and Decile
10 the 10 per cent with the highest incomes. The
distribution of some characteristic within a
decile is often expressed in terms of percentiles,
where the fiftieth percentile is the median value
of the characteristic in question. If the
characteristic is energy use, then the twentieth
percentile, for example, is the amount of energy
used by the household that is 20 per cent along
the energy distribution.
The first research task for this part of the
project was an investigation of the distribution
by income decile of UK household energy
expenditure, use and carbon emissions. This
information was then used to examine the
workability of combining a carbon tax to
encourage emission reductions with
compensation through the benefits system or
exemptions from the tax for low-income
households. It was found that, because of the
extreme variation in the energy use of low-
income households, and contrary to the initial
hypothesis of the research, it is not possible to
provide effective compensation to low-income
households for the tax in the way that had been
envisaged. The corollary is that a different
approach is required if the issue of carbon
emissions from non-poor households, as well as
that of fuel poverty, is to be addressed. The next
section goes into these issues in more detail, and
outlines a possible policy approach to reducing
the carbon emissions from non-poor
households.
Results
Examination of the relationship between income
and household energy use early established that
there is enormous variation in household
energy use within income deciles. In fact, those
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at the eightieth percentile of energy
consumption in the lowest (equivalent income)
decile1 consume nearly six times as much
energy as the twentieth percentile of the decile
and more than three-and-a-half times as much
energy as those at the twentieth percentile in the
highest decile. The variation in carbon
emissions is not as great, but is still very
substantial. It also emerged that the poorest
households pay substantially more per unit of
energy than the richest households: the median
price for those in the tenth decile was 2.8p/
kWh, compared to 3.29p/kWh, 20 per cent
more, for those in the first decile. A carbon tax
imposed equally on richer and poorer
households, without any compensation for poor
households, would therefore be very regressive
and would add to the unfair price burden these
households are already experiencing.
One approach to this problem would be to
introduce a new benefit for low-income
households (for example, for those already on
means-tested benefits), which would pay their
carbon tax payments for them (analogously to
Housing Benefit, which pays eligible
households’ rents). Establishing and
administering such a new benefit might be
feasible, but it would certainly be both complex
and expensive, requiring the relevant benefit
office(s) to obtain information about the annual
energy consumption of millions of households.
It would certainly be simpler to seek to
compensate households for their carbon tax
payments through the current benefit system,
and this is what has been explored here.
About 70 per cent of households receive a
state benefit, including many wealthy
households because of universal benefits, while
30 per cent of households receive income-
related benefits. The proportion of households
receiving income-related benefits is over 60 per
cent in the lowest three deciles, but it falls
sharply to only a few per cent in the highest
deciles.
A variety of ways of compensating poor
households was examined, using means-tested
benefits, child benefit, adjustments to
pensioners’ Winter Fuel Allowance (WFA) and
modifying the carbon tax. The various
compensation packages are summarised in
Table 2. Figures 1 to 6 show the results of the
compensation packages graphically, for the
bottom three deciles, households with
equivalent incomes of less than £11,065.
The first point to be seen from Figure 1 is
that, for the lowest decile, all the tax-plus-
compensation packages are progressive on
average (that is, the average household is a net
gainer). The amounts gained range from £1.77
per year (Package Number [PN]1) to £118.14 per
year (PN13).
Figures 2 and 3 show that the same is true
for Deciles 2 and 3, except in respect of PN11
when, not surprisingly, nearly all pensioner
households lose out from the redistribution of
some of their Winter Fuel Allowance to non-
pensioner low-income households. Essentially,
these results substantiate the hypothesis on
which this research was based, namely that it is
possible to make a carbon tax, such as that
imposed, progressive for the average household
in the lowest deciles.
However, the enormously skewed
distribution of energy consumption within the
income deciles means that the average result
conceals great differences in net gains and losses
within each decile. Figure 4 shows that none of
the compensation packages manages to reduce
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Table 2  Summary of compensation packages (package number)
Compensation package Results
CTPens1 (1) Pensioner households, with winter heating allowance increased by 90p
a week
CTPens2 (2) Pensioner households, with increase of Minimum Income Guarantee
(MIG) of £1.90/3.05 a week
CTChild1 (3) Households with children, with increase in family element in Child Tax
Credit (CTC) of £1 a week
CTChild2 (4) Households with children, with increase in amount per child in CTC
(and Housing Benefit/Council Tax Benefit) of £1.30 a week
CTAllPT (5) All households, increase in means-tested benefits
CTAllFT (6) All households 100 per cent take-up, increase in means-tested benefits
MCTAllPT (7) All households, modified carbon tax, partial take-up, increase in
means-tested benefits
MCTAllFT (8) All households, modified carbon tax, 100 per cent take-up, increase in
means-tested benefits
MCTPensFT (9) Households with pensioners, modified carbon tax, 100 per cent take-
up, increase in means-tested benefits
MCTWFA1AllFT (10) All households, modified carbon tax, 100 per cent take-up, reduce
Winter Fuel Allowance by £100 per annum and increase means-tested
benefits
MCTWFA1PensF (11) Households with pensioners, modified carbon tax, 100 per cent take-
up, reduce Winter Fuel Allowance by £100 p.a. and increase means-
tested benefits
MCTWFA2AllFT (12) All households, modified carbon tax 100 per cent take-up, reduce
Winter Fuel Allowance by £100 p.a. and increase means-tested benefits
targeted on Pension Credit
MCTWFA2PensFT (13) Households with pensioners, modified carbon tax, 100 per cent take-
up, reduce Winter Fuel Allowance by £100 p.a. and increase means-
tested benefits targeted on Pension Credit
the proportion of Decile 1 losing households
much below 20 per cent, and the five that do get
slightly below this figure (PN6, PN8, PN9, PN12,
PN13) all assume a 100 per cent take-up of the
relevant means-tested benefits, which is clearly
unlikely to be achieved. With the take-up of
benefits at current (partial) rates, none of the
compensation packages reduces the proportion
of all households in Decile 1 that lose out much
below 35 per cent (PN7 gives the lowest result at
34.9 per cent); 1.3 per cent of Decile 1 households
in this case lose more than £2 per week.
Figures 5 and 6 show that the pattern is
largely repeated in Deciles 2 and 3, except that
an even higher proportion of households lose
out and, with some packages, a greater
proportion by more than £2 per week.
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Figure 1  Decile 1
Figure 2  Decile 2
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Figure 4  Gainers and losers: Decile 1
Figure 5  Gainers and losers: Decile 2
Figure 6  Gainers and losers: Decile 3
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It is of course a political judgement whether
such an outcome – broadly progressive, with
reduced carbon emissions, bringing some
households out of fuel poverty but with a
significant negative impact on the third of
households that are likely to be deepest in fuel
poverty – would be socially acceptable. It would
of course be campaigned against by those
representing those among the fuel poor who are
made worse off. Possibly, they would be joined
in their campaign by the better off who might
also not welcome the substantial overall
redistribution in favour of poorer households
that a package like PN7 (the partial benefit
package with least Decile 1 losers) represents.
This makes this approach to increasing
household energy efficiency politically
problematic at best, and probably politically
infeasible.
Alternative approaches
There are a number of government programmes
(for example, Warm Front and the Energy
Efficiency Commitment) seeking to insulate the
homes of low-income households in order to
reduce, and ultimately abolish, fuel poverty.
One response to the results reported above
would be to continue with, or intensify, these
programmes, and to return to the issue of
imposing a carbon tax to incentivise the take-up
of energy-efficiency measures by the non-fuel
poor once the fuel poverty problem had been
substantially addressed. This would amount to
accepting a rise in household carbon emissions
over at least the next ten years, which is hardly
compatible with the ambitious carbon-reduction
targets to which the government says it is
committed. Moreover, because the continuation
of these programmes would still leave a
substantial number of houses, at present
occupied by the non-fuel poor, in their current,
badly insulated condition, fuel poverty could
always return if these houses became occupied
by those on low incomes.
An alternative, more ambitious, approach
would seek systematically to exploit the fact
that many households could make themselves
better off by implementing energy-efficiency
measures. Such an approach might seek to
persuade households to install all cost-effective
measures by imposing a ‘climate change
surcharge’ on all households that, after a certain
period of time, did not do so.
Under such an approach, to avoid paying
the surcharge, householders would first need to
have an energy audit of their home. Such audits
are currently widely available and, under the
EU Directive on the Energy Performance of
Buildings, will from 2006 in any case have to be
carried out for all houses that are being sold, so
that prospective buyers will know their likely
energy bills if they were to buy the house.
The energy audit could identify all cost-
effective measures that householders would
need to implement within a specified period of
time to avoid the climate change surcharge. It
would probably make sense to administer the
scheme through the local taxation system, such
as currently through Council Tax, but it could
perhaps be administered through the energy
billing system. Similarly, an avoidable surcharge
on Stamp Duty could encourage householders
to install the measures when moving into a new
home.
Council Tax is a tax levied on the occupiers
of property to contribute towards the cost of
providing local services. The properties are
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divided into a number of bands (A–H) related to
their prices in 1991, when the tax was
introduced. Homes built after 1991 are placed in
the same band as comparable properties in the
area. The Council Tax is set annually. D-rated
properties pay the standard charge. A-rated
(lowest priced) properties pay two-thirds of the
standard rate. H-rated (highest priced)
properties pay twice the standard rate, with the
other bands falling within this range.
Because not enough qualified installers of
energy-efficiency measures exist to carry out
this work all at once and it would take time to
train sufficient installers to increase the current
rate of energy-efficiency improvements to the
housing stock, the scheme could be
implemented over, say, ten years, starting with
the highest Council Tax bands (those who could
best afford to carry out the home
improvements) and working down the bands
over the years. Each year, householders in the
relevant band for that year could be notified
that, if they wished to avoid the climate change
surcharge in succeeding years, they would need
to implement all cost-effective energy-efficiency
measures in their home. They could be advised
how to obtain an energy audit of their home,
which would deliver them a certificate listing all
such measures. On completion of these
measures by a qualified installer (chosen by the
householder from a list of recommended
installers), they would receive an
implementation certificate, which they would
send to the appropriate office to forestall or
cancel the surcharge in the future. All
households that implemented all cost-effective
measures within a year of notification would
therefore pay no surcharge. For most
households, the financial savings following
implementation of the measures would be
substantial.
A ring-fenced fund could be established, into
which any surcharges would be paid, to provide
low-cost loans to carry out the measures to
households on medium incomes. These loans
could be recovered through the surcharge
mechanism in succeeding years, once the energy
savings had started to materialise, at a rate
calculated to reflect those savings. Depending
on its resources, the fund could also pay grants
to households eligible for the Warm Front
scheme, or the measures could be carried out
directly through the scheme.
Thirty per cent of Council Tax payers in
England are tenants (ODPM, 2002). It would not
be fair to expect them to pay for energy-
efficiency improvements to the properties they
live in or for them to have to pay a surcharge
because their landlord did not pay for the
necessary improvements. Social landlords
already have an obligation to bring their
properties up to a specified ‘Decent Homes’
standard, and achievement of this would
exempt them from having to undertake further
measures over the lifetime of the scheme. One
solution for tenants in the private sector would
be to give them the right to deduct any imposed
surcharge from their rent. In that way, the
responsibility for making the improvements
would be transferred from the tenants to the
landlords with whom it should belong.
Once houses had been made energy-
efficient, there would be little continuing
rationale for the winter fuel payment to those
over 60. This could be phased out, the savings in
public expenditure being channelled into
energy-efficiency measures for low-income
households.
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Implementation of such a scheme would
save a minimum of 10 per cent of household
carbon emissions (about 4 mtc). The measures
would cost householders £6.4 billion, but would
save them a net present value of £19.7 billion.
The average rate of return to householders
would be 23 per cent. Overall, it would result in
the whole housing stock being brought up to a
cost-effective level of energy efficiency over ten
years, greatly reducing fuel poverty, as well as
saving carbon emissions, in the process. Over
the subsequent ten years, a further programme
could concentrate on hard-to-heat homes (such
as those with solid walls), which would still be
excessively energy intensive. The programme
could be financed through a carbon tax imposed
on those homes that had already been insulated
(with redistribution through the benefit system
now being able effectively to compensate those
on low incomes because the households in hard-
to-heat homes could be identified for
assistance). Twenty years after the beginning of
the process, the UK housing stock would at least
have been brought up to the level of efficiency
to match the rest of Northern Europe. Fuel
poverty would be a phenomenon of the past
except in cases of severe under-occupation.
Carbon emissions would be substantially
reduced. And most householders would be
financially better off because of their more
efficient use of energy, even taking the carbon
tax into account. The only losers would be those
householders who wished to continue to
exercise their right to use energy in their homes
inefficiently, or those whose dislike of the
process of upgrading their home (and the
inevitable administration and possible
disruption this might cause) exceeded the net
financial benefit they would receive. Their costs
might be considered justified in the light of their
excess contribution to climate change.
Few other public policies have such a
positive overall generation and distribution of
economic, social and environmental benefits. It
is an indication of the low political priority that
is still given to climate change that such a
scheme is still not being given serious political
consideration.
Conclusions
Household energy use varies widely between
households, even those with similar incomes.
While a carbon tax on household energy use is
desirable for environmental reasons, it would
have a greater proportionate impact on most
low-income households than on richer ones (i.e.
it would be regressive), unless the poorer
households were compensated in some way. A
new benefit, which paid the carbon tax for these
households, would remove the regressivity, but
would be complex and expensive to administer.
Using the current benefit system, it would not
be difficult to design a compensation scheme to
remove the regressivity for low-income
households on average, but their wide variation
in energy use means that some low-income
households could still be left significantly worse
off. This might make such a tax politically
unacceptable.
Current government policies in this area rely
principally on subsidising the installation of
energy-efficiency measures in houses, with the
measures aimed mainly at those in fuel poverty.
It is unlikely that such an approach will even
prevent household emissions from growing in
future, let alone result in households making a
positive contribution to the government’s
carbon-reduction targets.
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Another way of incentivising the installation
of energy-efficiency measures in non-fuel-poor
households would be to impose a climate
change surcharge on those households that did
not install cost-effective energy-efficiency
measures within a specified time. The scheme
discussed in this report would effectively
abolish fuel poverty, could achieve carbon
savings of 4 mtc over ten years and save
households nearly £20 billion net present value
for an investment of £6.4 billion. It would also
eventually permit a non-regressive carbon tax to
be imposed, which could militate against the
growth of household carbon emissions in the
future. The fact that such a scheme currently
seems not to be considered politically feasible
suggests that the public and political will to
mitigate climate change is not yet very
powerful.
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The need to manage water use
England is generally thought of as a wet
country, but in fact rainfall in much of the
country is moderate (and East Anglia is
officially semi-arid), while the population
density is high, especially in the South of
England. As a consequence, England has less
water resources per capita than Spain or
Portugal. In the Thames Water region, water
resources per capita are less than in Ethiopia or
Sudan (World Resources Institute, 1999).
Water usage in England and Wales rose more
or less continually during the twentieth century
and particularly after the Second World War. Per
capita consumption rose dramatically between
1961 (87 litres per person per day) and 1999 (146
litres per person per day). However, because
industrial demand for water has been falling
since the 1970s, total water usage increased
more slowly. It peaked in 1996 and by 1999 had
fallen around 15 per cent to the levels of the
mid-1970s (National Consumer Council, 2000,
2002). The main reason for the dramatic fall was
that, after the 1996 drought, Ofwat gave the
water companies strict and binding targets for
leakage reduction. However, leakage reduction
is a one-time gain and even by 2001/02 leakage
was already increasing again, particularly in the
Thames region (Environment Agency, 2002).
Total future water demand in England may
either rise or fall over the period until 2025
depending on the extent to which water-
conservation policies are followed
(Environment Agency, 2001). In parts of the
country, particularly the South and East,
population increases are expected that would be
likely to place additional demands on water
resources. Unfortunately, the South and the East
are the two regions that already have the
greatest difficulties in meeting demand. Many
regions already have excessive river abstraction
and the southern and eastern regions also have
unsustainable groundwater abstraction. The
South and the East are beyond their sustainable
use of water resources. Other regions are at or
near the limits. Only in the North East is there
additional water available. In regions other than
the North East, there is little capacity to increase
the water supply (Environment Agency, 2001).
That means that the capacity to meet increased
demand is very limited. In addition, expected
climate change over the next decades causing
hotter and drier weather will reduce the supply
of rainwater and is likely to increase demand for
water. The effect of climate change on water
resources is likely to be particularly pronounced
in southern and eastern England.
In this situation, it is curious that the water
usage of most households in the UK is not
measured. Among OECD countries, only the
UK and Ireland do not measure the water use of
most households (OECD, 1999). Consequently,
UK water companies generally have very poor
data on how much water is being used by
households in different areas, and what factors
influence that use. Their ability to manage the
household use of water, and indeed households’
ability to manage such use themselves, is low.
The contrast between water and other utilities
(gas, electricity, telephone), the use of all of
which is measured on a unit basis, is marked.
The need to measure water use in order to
manage it is a strong argument in favour of
universal water metering, especially in those
regions that have been or may be affected by
water shortages.
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Especially in a context of increasing
household water demand, another argument in
favour of metering is that it can help to conserve
water – metering has been found to reduce
water consumption by about 10 per cent on
average (National Metering Trials Working
Group, 1993). It is in fact not surprising that
people tend to use less water when they pay for
it on a per unit basis than when it is free at the
point of use, and this difference would be likely
to become more marked either as people moved
towards less water-intensive equipment (which
would then save them money), or water became
more expensive, because of increasing scarcity.
Concerns over water metering
One argument against metering is that there are
cheaper ways of conserving water, as shown in
Table 3. For instance, low-flush toilets reduce
total water consumption by nearly as much as
metering does, but low-flush toilets cost less
than metering does. Water metering costs £20–
30 per household per annum. However, it is not
clear how people will be persuaded to install
low-flush toilets, efficient appliances and water-
saving taps and showerheads if they do not
have any incentive to do it. Nor is it easy to
establish how much water they would in fact
save when the water consumption to which
they relate is not measured. The point of water
Table 3  Cost-effectiveness of different demand-supply options
Demand Ratio to cost
management of increasing Likely water
cost (p/m3) water supply savings
Demand management Low-cost High-cost  Per cent
option supply supply Ml/day of input
Leakage control target
   (4.05 l/p/hr) 19.7 0.5 0.3 3,151 18.5
Compulsory universal metering 94 2.5 1.4 1,233 7.2
Voluntary metering 113 3.0 1.7 538 3.2
Compulsory metering –
   sprinkler users 51 1.3 0.8 240 1.4
Metering as part of
   rehabilitation works 36 1.0 0.6 1,233 7.2
Converting 9-litre WCs to
   7.5-litre 27.2 0.7 0.4 543 3.2
Converting 9-litre WCs to
   dual-flush 17.2 0.5 0.3 858 5.0
£100 subsidy to replace
   pre-1981 WCs with 6-litre WCs 74.5 2.0 1.1 268 1.6
Natural replacement of
   pre-1981 WCs with 6-litre WCs
   over 20 years – – – 357 2.1
Source: Clark et al. (1998a, p. 10)
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metering is not just to gain the 7–10 per cent
reduction in water consumption that occurs
initially, but also to create a situation where
people will install water-saving equipment in
future, and where the result of them doing so
will be apparent.
Another argument against water metering is
that increased water demand can be addressed
by increasing supply, as has been done in the
past. In pure financial terms, as Table 3 shows,
increasing supply is more expensive than
leakage control, converting 9-litre WCs or
metering as part of rehabilitation works (Clark
et al., 1998a, p. 10). It is about as expensive as the
compulsory metering of sprinkler users, but
cheaper than universal metering, while
voluntary metering (the current situation in the
UK) is the most expensive option of all.
However, these comparisons do not take into
account the environmental costs of increasing
supply in terms of damage to wetlands and
estuaries, and consequent loss of habitat and
biodiversity (Clark et al., 1998a, pp. 6–7). The
case for water metering, as opposed to
increasing supply, rests on environmental
arguments. Increasing abstraction of river water
and groundwater is cheap, but unsustainable in
the long term. Building more reservoirs is more
expensive financially and involves using up
land, and may be no cheaper than water
metering. It clearly has a much greater
environmental impact than water metering. In
most of England and Wales, there is little or no
capacity to increase water supply without
unacceptable environmental impacts
(Environment Agency, 2001).
It is also argued that water metering is unfair
because most of the costs of the industry are
fixed. John Thackray of the Public Utilities
Access Forum has estimated that they can be
divided as shown in Table 4.
Opponents of metering argue that most of
these costs are not dependent on the quantity of
water used, so charging on the basis of use is
irrelevant. However, the quantity of water used
does have an impact on cost. The social costs of
additional marginal use of water are high,
particularly in regions that are short of supply
and are making unsustainable use of
abstraction. What is more, the rising water
consumption by households in recent years is
entirely accounted for by increases in non-
essential uses. Not charging for use means that
there is no incentive for less wasteful use. It is
important to note that, when Ofwat surveyed
consumers, they identified water metering as
Table 4  Summary of water industry costs
Industry cost Per cent
Water supply pipe network 30
Water resources and treatment 20
Sewer network 10
Sewage treatment and disposal 20
Rainwater disposal from properties 10
Highway drainage 10
Source: Thackray (1997)
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the fairest way to pay for water (National
Consumer Council, 2000).
Another particular concern that is often
expressed about water metering is that it can
lead to poorer households cutting back on
essential uses such as personal hygiene. There is
some evidence to support this concern (DoE/
Ofwat, 1992; Consumers’ Association, 1996), but
attempts to prove that this leads to higher rates
of disease have failed to show a link (Clark et al.,
1998a). Nonetheless, the British Medical
Association (BMA) has stated that water is vital
to halting the chain of infection and should
therefore be available to all at an affordable
price (BMA, 1994).
However, it is not the intention of this
chapter to seek to adjudicate between the
arguments for the various options in Table 3.
Rather, the chapter is based on an
acknowledgement that there are strong
arguments in favour of water metering and that
metering may therefore be introduced into the
UK on a universal basis, as it has been in other
countries. The research described in this chapter
is addressed to the question of what charging
structures relating to metering could be
introduced in order to limit the financial impact
of metering on low-income households, should
metering be introduced. In order to consider
this question, it is necessary first of all to
consider how the household use of water is
currently paid for in the UK.
Current methods of water charging
The traditional method of charging domestic
customers for water in the UK has been on the
basis of rateable values (RVs), a hangover from
the days of local authority ownership of the
water supply. The water bill is divided into a
standing charge (the same for each household)
and an additional charge based on the rateable
value of the home. Some water companies make
the standing charge the main element of the bill;
others make the rateable value the main element
of the bill. RVs were last assessed in 1973, so
they bear little relation to present property
values. Other anomalies in the valuation system
are that RVs are lower for houses than for
equivalent flats and that RVs tend to be very
low for rural properties and pre-1919 properties,
even if they are large and valuable (Thackray,
1997). The rateable value system was abolished
for local government taxation in 1989 and nearly
all homes built or substantially renovated since
1990 have had water meters installed. In 1989, it
was legislated that RVs would be abolished for
water-charging purposes in 2000 and replaced
with an unspecified alternative system, but the
deadline was deferred into the indefinite future
by the 1999 Water Industry Act.
Water metering became an option for
existing properties in 1990. By 1999, 17 per cent
of households were metered (National
Consumer Council, 2000). Since 2000,
households have had the right to the free
installation of a meter and the proportion
metered had reached around 23 per cent by 2002
(Ofwat, 2002). A complaint made against the
optional metering that exists now is that the
people who take it up tend to be small
households in larger properties, generally richer
than the average. Because variable costs are only
a proportion of the costs of the water industry,
what happens is that the bills of people who are
not metered, generally poorer, increase
(National Consumer Council, 2000). Obviously
this could be addressed by increasing the
volumetric charge to metered customers, but
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this would reduce the incentive to switch to
metering. Another source of contention is that,
also in order to encourage people to switch to
metering, the additional administrative costs of
metering and billing are not borne by those
being metered, but shared among all
consumers, which is effectively a subsidy of the
metered by the non-metered. Since those opting
for voluntary metering tend to be the better off
who live in high rateable value homes, and the
non-metered tend to be poorer, in this respect
poorer consumers are subsidising richer
consumers. On the other hand, as noted above,
the RV system is itself an extensive system of
often illogical cross-subsidies. In particular,
those in rural areas are heavily subsidised by
those in urban areas. They impose higher costs,
yet often they actually pay less. An even more
illogical subsidy is of those in older houses by
those in more modern properties because of the
characteristics of the RV system.
As noted above, most households in other
OECD countries except Ireland are metered
(OECD, 1999), but water charging in England
and Wales has a higher proportional impact on
poorer households than in any other of nine
OECD countries surveyed except possibly
Mexico (OECD, 2003, p. 61). Although the
average proportion of disposable income spent
on the water supply in England and Wales is 1.2
per cent, which is about average, the proportion
of income spent by the lowest decile is 3.75 per
cent, the second highest among the nine OECD
countries compared – Mexico is just ahead at
3.84 per cent. In no other country was it above
2.53 per cent. The ratio of the burden on the
lowest-income group compared to the burden
on the average is highest in England and Wales
(3.1), followed closely by Mexico (3.0). This
shows that the widely repeated claim that water
metering necessarily has a greater proportional
impact on poorer households than the RV
system used in the UK is quite false.
The reason why the current system of water
charging in England and Wales is so regressive
is probably because a large proportion of
unmeasured water bills consist of a standing
charge that is the same across all households in
the water company’s area. Only a proportion of
the bill is based on rateable value. This is one of
the aspects examined in the metering tariff
structures explored later in this report.
Past research on metering
There is some previous work on the effect of
water metering in the UK. The Institute for
Fiscal Studies (IFS) examined the question of the
regressivity of water metering in England and
Wales in 1993 (Pearson et al., 1993). Assuming
that there was a fixed charge of £30 per
household irrespective of consumption (to cover
the fixed costs of metering each household) and
that the remainder of the cost would be based
on water usage at a flat rate per cubic metre,
they found that the bottom three deciles break
even on average. The middle four deciles lose a
little, the eighth decile breaks even, the ninth
decile gains a little and the top decile gains a
great deal. That is because the top quintile
actually uses less water than the third and
fourth quintiles because it tends to live in
smaller households.
Because a certain amount of water use is
vital for both health and hygiene, a popular idea
in the design of socially conscious water tariffs
is the idea of a ‘lifeline’ allowance of free or
fixed-cost water to cover essential uses. The
intention is to prevent water metering resulting
20
Green taxes and charges
in poor households sacrificing hygiene in order
to save money. In Flanders, each individual is
given a ‘free’ allowance of 15 m3 of water per
annum (equivalent to 41.1 litres/day) to cover
essential use, with metered payment for use
above that amount (OECD, 1999), but, without
an identity card system, this would be difficult
to implement in the UK. Herrington (1996)
instead proposed an allowance of 60 litres per
person per day based on one adult plus the
number of children in the household, using
child benefit records.
A study by OXERA (Clark et al., 1998a,
1998b) for UK Water Industry Research used
data from the Severn Trent Domestic
Consumption Monitor (DCM), which enabled
them to predict what would be the effect on
individual households of different water-
metering tariffs. The tariffs involved different
combinations of a standing charge, unit price,
free allowances, increasing unit prices for
increasing levels of water use (the ‘rising block’
tariff), selective metering of households in
higher Council Tax bands and summer
surcharges.
OXERA first attempted to assess the
environmental benefits in terms of demand
reduction from the different tariffs, based on the
ranges identified in a review of the literature.
The demand reduction varied from 8 to 28 per
cent, depending on whether a low or high
demand reaction was assumed, with the latter
rising to 36 per cent of summer demand with a
summer surcharge. In terms of distributional
results, and using pessimistic assumptions
about cost reductions from a switch to metering,
OXERA found that the first three tariffs – the
standard tariff, the rising block tariff and the
summer surcharge tariff – make about half of
households better off, and half of households
worse off.
Approach
The research undertaken by PSI in the present
project has used data kindly provided by
Anglian Water, divided between metered and
unmetered households. The crucial difference
between this data and the Severn Trent data
used in the earlier studies is that it provides
information about household incomes. For the
first time in the UK, it is possible to directly
examine how water consumption varies in
relation to income. That means it is also possible
to directly examine the distributional impact of
different universal water-metering tariffs.
Although a simple regression analysis found
that household income does correlate with
household water consumption, a multiple
regression analysis gave the rather surprising
result that it is not a higher income itself that
makes households use more water, but other
factors (for example, having a garden, courtyard
or sprinkler) that tend to correlate with income.
In terms of quantity of water use, the data
shows that the first adult in a household on
average uses around 140 litres/day (50 m3/
year). A second or additional adult uses around
100 litres/day (35 m3/year). A child uses
around 60 litres/day (20 m3/year). The figures
for unmetered households are somewhat higher
and the figures for metered households are
somewhat lower.
The range of usage even by households with
the same number of adults and children paying
on the same basis is quite wide. Households at
the ninetieth percentile use between two and
three times as much water as equivalent
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households at the tenth percentile. Households at
the eightieth percentile use nearly twice as much
water as equivalent households at the twentieth
percentile. It is not clear that this extra use by
such a large number of households, compared to
similar households, can be justified on the basis
of medical conditions or similar needs.
A number of approaches were taken to
designing metering tariffs, in simulations of
metering using the Anglian data, in order to
study the distributional effects and, particularly,
the effects of metering on low-income
households. It has already been noted that the
current system of water charging (still
predominantly based on rateable values) is
more regressive than in other industrialised
countries that have universal or nearly universal
metering of household water use. It is most
unlikely that universal metering will be
regarded as politically acceptable in the UK if it
makes this existing regressivity worse. At the
same time, given the range of water usage even
between similar households revealed by the
Anglian data, it is also most unlikely that any
switch to metering will leave no low-income
household worse off, unless it involves a degree
of cross-subsidy of poorer households by richer
households that is also likely to be politically
problematic. The politics of water metering
needs therefore to take account of three factors:
factor one, the overall regressivity of the system;
factor two, the negative impacts on individual,
high-water-using, low-income households; and,
factor three, the degree of redistribution (from
richer to poorer households) that is required to
reduce factors one and two. The results that are
reported from the simulations for different tariff
options therefore focus on these factors.
As noted above, a certain amount water use
is vital for both health and hygiene. For this
reason, a popular idea in the design of socially
conscious water tariffs is the idea of a ‘lifeline’
allowance of free or fixed-cost water to cover
essential uses. The intention is to prevent water
metering resulting in poor households
sacrificing hygiene in order to save money.
The simulations that have been modelled,
comprising 11 different tariff options in all, are
of five types:
• a simple switch to water metering on the
basis of the Anglian tariff (see Table 5)
• a switch to water metering using tariffs
that vary by Council Tax band
• a switch to water metering that
incorporates a lifeline allowance that may
also vary with Council Tax band
• a switch that involves a combination of
tariffs and a lifeline allowance that may
also vary with Council Tax band
• a switch using the Severn Trent tariff (see
Table 5).
In all the simulations, it has been assumed
that there were no demand reductions induced
by the switch to metering. This is unrealistic. To
the extent that metering induces demand
reductions (which, in line with the results in the
previous section, could be from 7–28 per cent,
assuming no summer surcharge), and especially
if these reductions are concentrated in high-
water-using households, the negative financial
effects of the switch on high-water-using
households will be reduced.
As can be seen, some of the simulations
differentiate between households on the basis of
their Council Tax band. Council Tax is regressive,
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Table 5  Anglian Water and Severn Trent Water Zone 4 tariffs (£) for April 2002–March 2003
Water Sewerage
Anglian Severn Trent Anglian Severn Trent
Unmetered
Standing charge 69.12 0 91.89 0
RV multiplier 0.3678 0.5863 0.4807 0.5290
Metered
Standing charge 20 16.68 44 8.40
Volumetric charge/m3 0.8144 0.7077 0.9688 0.4820
Note: in addition, metered Severn Trent customers (but not unmetered ones) pay a property-based
fixed charge for surface water drainage of £15.72 for a flat or terrace, £31.44 for a semi-detached and
£47.16 for a detached house
in that a Band H property is worth at least eight
times as much as a Band A property (and
incomes between the top and bottom deciles vary
by much more than this), but the Council Tax
paid, which is calculated on the basis of the ratio
of the band in question to Band D, is only three
times as much. In some of the simulations that
follow it was therefore decided to use Council
Tax bands, but ‘stretch’ them so that the amount
paid was roughly proportional to the value of the
property in 1991, in the manner of rateable
values. The actual ‘stretched’ ratios used are
reported in Dresner and Ekins (2004b).
Table 5 shows Anglian Water and Severn
Trent tariffs for 2002–03, from which it can be
seen that the most significant difference is that,
uniquely among water companies, unmetered
Severn Trent customers pay no standing charge,
and metered Severn Trent customers pay lower
standing charges.
According to Ofwat, the tariff differential for
Anglian Water customers in 2002–03 was £20.
That is to say that, if a household with average
rateable value switched from the unmetered to
the metered tariff and had water consumption
equal to the average unmeasured household,
they would pay £20 more, calculated as a
contribution towards the cost of metering. Of
course, households that actually switch to
metering tend to have higher RVs and use less
water than the average, so that the switch is
financially advantageous to them.
Results
Table 6 sets out a number of the results from the
simulations that reflect the three key political
factors described above. The analysis focused on
whether, on average, households in the lower-
income bands (less than £10,000 and £10,000–
20,000 per annum) would be better or worse off
with the various options than they are with the
Anglian tariff (i.e. if options made effects less
regressive), and the proportion of households in
these income bands whose costs would rise by
more than £1 a week. It also considered whether
the various options would be redistributive by
looking at the extent to which households on
incomes of £40,000 plus lost out, and lost out by
more than £1 a week.
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Table 6  Comparison of results from various metering tariff options
Households <£10,000 Households £10–20,000 Households >£40,000
Proportion Proportion Proportion
Average loss losing more Average loss losing more  Average loss losing
or gain than £1 p.w. or gain than £1 p.w. or gain more than
£ p.w. (%) £ p.w. (%) £ p.w. £1 p.w. (%)
Option 1 +0.34 8 –0.02 15 –0.09 17
Option 2 +0.67 9 +0.39 10 –0.14 21
Option 3 +1.09 6 +0.81 12 +0.36 37
Option 4 +0.59 9 +0.24 15 –0.50 33
Option 5 +0.31 12 +0.01 15 –0.17 25
Option 6 +0.39 11 +0.08 15 –0.31 26
Option 7 +1.48 13 +0.79 20 –1.83 57
Option 8 +2.20 10 +1.49 14 –3.11 43
Option 9 +1.16 8 +0.93 11 –2.00 45
Option 10 +0.72 12 +0.50 13 –1.19 47
Option 11 +1.57 18 +0.81 23 –1.69 55
The various tariff options are set out below.
The results quoted are for both currently
metered and RV Anglian customers, apart from
Option 1. All results assume that there has been
no demand reduction as a result of metering.
Option 1 Metering with existing Anglian
Water tariff (effect on RV customers
only, no effect on existing metered
customers).
Option 2 Metering with the volumetric rate
varying according to current
Council Tax bands.
Option 3 Metering with the volumetric rate
varying according to stretched
Council Tax band ratios.
Option 4 Metering with standing charge
varying according to stretched
Council Tax band ratios.
Option 5 Metering with a fixed lifeline
allowance of 15 m3 per capita and
an increased price per litre of water.
Option 6 Metering with a fixed lifeline
allowance of 20 m3 per capita for
the first adult and each child and an
increased price per litre of water.
Option 7 Metering with an allowance
varying according to Council Tax
band.
Option 8 Metering with both a lifeline
allowance and the charge per litre
of water varying according to
stretched Council Tax band ratios.
Option 9 Metering with a fixed lifeline
allowance of 20 m3 per capita for
the first adult and each child, and
the charge per litre of water varying
according to stretched Council Tax
band ratios.
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Option 10 Metering with a fixed lifeline
allowance of 20 m3 per capita for
the first adult and each child, and
the charge per litre of water varying
according to current Council Tax
band ratios.
Option 11 Metering with both the standing
charge and lifeline allowance
varying according to current
Council Tax band.
First, from Table 6 and Figures 7, 8 and 9 it
can be seen that all the investigated options are
progressive from the point of view of the
lowest-income households and all but one
(Option 1) are also progressive for the next
income group (those with incomes of £10–
20,000). Moreover, a very similar result for
Option 9 was obtained using the Severn Trent
rather than the Anglian Water tariff, with its
high standing charges. This shows that the
result was not a function of the structure of the
Anglian tariff. It is likely to hold across all water
customers, whatever their water company.
There is therefore no basis for supposing that
switching to metering will, on average, make
low-income households worse off. All the
options investigated actually make them better
off on average, some quite substantially so. In
view of the fact that current water-charging
systems are generally regressive, many would
consider that a switch to such tariffs entailed a
fairer treatment of water customers.
Second, there is no tariff that does not make
6 per cent or more of the lowest-income
households worse off by more than £1 per week.
These will tend to be the highest water-
consuming households in this income group.
For some of them, their high water use will
reflect discretionary rather than essential use
and a cutback in that use would reduce these
extra charges they would pay under metering
(Options 5–11 include a lifeline allowance, to
reduce the likelihood of cutbacks on essential
water use). It may be noted again that the
calculations above assume no reduction in
discretionary use of water as a result of the
metering, so they clearly represent the
maximum likely cost impacts. Where the high
water use of losing households is essential, this
is likely to be because of medical reasons and it
should be possible to make special
arrangements. The government has already
introduced a vulnerable groups scheme
(DEFRA, 2003), which caps the bills of those
identified as having high essential water use
and efforts could be made to boost the currently
low take-up of the scheme by those who are
entitled to its benefits. In these two ways, it is
likely that the great majority of low-income
households would be able to reduce any extra
charges they would face under the metering
tariffs.
Third, the tariffs vary considerably in the
degree of redistribution from richer to poorer
that they bring about (as noted above, all are
redistributive in this direction to some extent).
The least redistributive (the option that benefits
low-income households least) is Option 5, with
the average cost to the richest households being
only £0.17 per week and only 25 per cent losing
more than £1 per week. The option that benefits
low-income households most, and in which the
richest households lose more than £3 per week,
is Option 8.
Which of these tariff options is ‘best’
depends on political perspective. Option 3
(volumetric rate varying according to stretched
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Council Tax bands) leaves fewest households in
the two lowest income groups worse off by over
£1 per week. Option 8 (lifeline allowance and
the charge per litre of water varying according
to stretched Council Tax band ratios) is very
similar in this respect, but is substantially more
redistributive from richer to poorer households.
Option 4 (standing charge varying according to
stretched Council Tax bands) is also similar in
this respect, but is less redistributive. Option 5
(a lifeline allowance of 20 m3 per capita for the
first adult and each child and an increased price
per litre of water) is least redistributive, as noted
above, but leaves more low-income households
with extra bills in excess of £1 per week (12 per
cent as opposed to 6 per cent for Option 3).
It may also be noted that it would be
possible to introduce a tariff with a surcharge
for significantly greater water use in summer,
when water is most scarce and when some
people use large quantities of water for their
gardens, which may be classed as a
discretionary rather than as an essential use.
The OXERA study suggested that such a
modification of a tariff would have both
environmental and distributional merits.
Unfortunately, it was too difficult to model here.
However, it may be worth consideration if
summer water conservation becomes an
increasingly important concern.
Conclusions
This research shows that there is no basis for a
perception that a move to universal water
metering in the UK will be regressive. On the
contrary, all 11 of the metering tariff options
investigated here made the lowest income
group better off on average. This was also true
for the second lowest income group for ten out
of the 11 options. Some of the options,
particularly those based on ‘stretched’ Council
Tax bands, involve quite large transfers from
richer to poorer households, but, if this is
considered politically problematic, there are
other options that do not. Given that current
charging tariffs based on old rateable values
tend to be regressive, water metering on the
basis of the tariffs presented here is more likely
to reduce regressivity than increase it.
Because of differences in water use between
low-income households, some, especially larger
households, would be made worse off by water
metering if their water consumption remained
unchanged by it. For five of the tariff options,
the proportion of households in the lowest
income group losing more than £1 per week is
less than 10 per cent. For all the 11 options, it is
less than 20 per cent. However, most of the
options include a lifeline of free or cheap water
(which may or may not be phased out for richer
households) to safeguard essential uses that are
required to maintain health and hygiene. And,
of course, all households could reduce their
metered charges by reducing their discretionary
or wasteful use of water.
It should also be possible to safeguard the
relatively few households that have medical
conditions that require high volumes of water
use, although the take-up of the current
government scheme that seeks to achieve this
will need to be increased if sceptics on this point
are to be convinced.
Metering, therefore, could be financially
beneficial for most low-income households,
provided that care was taken with the design of
tariff structures. It is hoped that, should
universal metering be adopted in the UK, in
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some regions or as a whole, such detailed tariff
design issues will get adequate consideration, so
that the change does not have social effects that
were not intended.
28
Background
Car traffic has gone up by 79 per cent since 1980,
from 215 to 384 billion vehicle kilometres. It
grew sharply in the 1980s, but has been rising
less quickly since. Road traffic grew by 14 per
cent between 1990 and 2000 (DfT, 2003a). Road
vehicles currently account for 22 per cent of UK
carbon dioxide emissions (Foley and Fergusson,
2003, p. 7), which increased by 7.4 per cent over
1990–2000 (DEFRA, 2004a), despite substantial
improvements in vehicle efficiency. One reason
why car traffic growth in the 1990s was lower
than is expected for the 2000s was because of
the fuel duty escalator, which increased fuel
duty by 5–6 per cent above inflation each year
from 1993 to 1999, since when fuel duty has
fallen in real terms. For the first time in a period
of rapid economic growth, in the late 1990s,
traffic grew less quickly than GDP. Econometric
analysis indicates that the fuel duty escalator
revealed significant price elasticity (Glaister,
2001).
The overall cost of motoring (including
purchase, maintenance, petrol and oil, and tax
and insurance) has remained at or below its
1980 level in real terms, although the real cost of
fuel in 2003 was 12 per cent higher than in 1980,
despite a fall in 2001. In contrast to overall
motoring costs, public transport fares have risen
in real terms over the last 20 years. In 2001, bus
and coach fares were 31 per cent higher and rail
fares 37 per cent higher than in 1980. Over the
same period, average disposable income has
gone up more than 80 per cent in real terms.
Transport has therefore become more affordable,
with a greater improvement in the affordability
of car use than that of public transport (DfT,
2003a).
Although the majority of the growth in
transport over the last 20 years has been in
travel by car, up from 388 billion passenger
kilometres in 1980 to 624 billion in 2001 – an
increase of 61 per cent, there were increases in
travel by rail and domestic air, of 34 and 157 per
cent respectively. Distance travelled by bus and
coach fell by 17 per cent between 1980 and 1992,
but it has since increased by around 7 per cent.
Emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) from
transport end users increased from 28 to 37
million tonnes of carbon between 1980 and 1990
– a time when road traffic was growing quickly.
Despite further growth in traffic since 1990,
levels of CO2 emissions from road transport
have been growing at a much slower rate,
mainly because of technological improvements
and the use of cleaner fuels. Energy
consumption by transport has increased
continuously since 1981, from 34 to 55 million
tonnes of oil equivalent by 2001 – up 62 per
cent. Road transport accounted for most of the
increase during the 1980s, but has since been
fairly stable despite continued growth in traffic.
Indeed, most of transport’s increase in energy
consumption during the 1990s was accounted
for by domestic aviation, up from seven to 12
million tonnes of oil equivalent (DfT, 2003a).
Domestic aviation accounts for only 5 per
cent of the UK’s total aviation emissions, but
emissions from international aviation
emanating from the UK are not included in UK
government transport statistics or counted in
the UK’s targets under the Kyoto Protocol. The
government’s Climate Change Programme has
policies to reduce emissions from other sectors,
but ignores aviation emissions. The effect is far
from trivial. Carbon emissions from
international aviation traffic to and from UK
4 Household use of transport
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airports nearly doubled from four million
tonnes of carbon (mtc) in 1990 to 7.8 mtc in 2000,
and are projected to increase to around 12.3 mtc
by 2010. The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that the global
warming potential of emissions from aviation is
two to four times that of the carbon emissions
alone – because of the effect of the emission of
water vapour and nitrogen oxide (NOx) at very
high altitudes (IPCC, 1999), so the increase
between 1990 and 2000 was equivalent to 7.6–
15.2 mtc. The expected increase 1990–2010 is
equivalent in global warming potential to 16.6–
33.2 mtc – or 8–16 per cent of UK baseline
emissions. In other words, the UK’s 12.5 per
cent reduction in domestic emissions between
1990 and 2010 under the Kyoto Protocol will be
largely or more than offset by its increase in
international aviation emissions. The middle
traffic growth projection to 2020 would increase
emissions to 18 mtc, equivalent to 36–72 mtc.
That is 5.7 mtc more than 2010 emissions,
equivalent in global warming potential to 11.4–
22.8 mtc or another 6–12 per cent of emissions.
The rapid and uncontrolled rise in aviation
emissions is likely to overwhelm the effect of
other government policies to reduce carbon
emissions (Edinburgh Centre for Carbon
Management, 2002).
However, emissions from future road traffic
growth also present a challenge. Traffic growth
was held back in the 1990s by the fuel duty
escalator. Road traffic is predicted to grow by
20–25 per cent between 2000 and 2010. Because
the average fuel efficiency of cars is projected to
improve by 20 per cent over the same period,
the result would be broadly stable carbon
emissions (DfT, 2003b), at a time when the
government is seeking substantial overall
emission reductions to meet international and
domestic commitments. But even these
conclusions have been questioned in a recent
Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) study
(Foley and Fergusson, 2003), which argued that
the improvement in fuel efficiency predicted by
the National Transport Model (DfT, 2003b) was
based on optimistic and somewhat dubious
assumptions.
Taxation of car use has been a particularly
sensitive issue since the fuel protests of autumn
2000. Petrol taxes are not regressive in aggregate
because poorer households are less likely to
have a car. However, petrol taxes are regressive
among motorists (Blow and Crawford, 1997).
Nearly a third of households do not have a
car and non-car-owning households are
concentrated among the lowest-income groups.
Sixty-three per cent of households in the lowest-
income quintile and 50 per cent in the second
lowest do not have access to a car. By contrast,
only 22 per cent of households in the third
quintile, 12 per cent in the fourth quintile and 6
per cent in the top quintile are without access to
a car (Lucas et al., 2001). However, in all
quintiles, travel by car (whether as a driver or a
passenger) accounted for most of the miles
travelled. It is clear that people in all income
groups tend to have a strong desire for the
greater mobility and independence offered by a
car, compared with public transport. The
resulting increase in car ownership has led to a
decline in public transport, particularly buses,
which has accentuated the relative advantages
or disadvantages of owning or not owning a car.
It has also led to more travel-intensive lifestyles,
which are considered to more or less require the
use of a car, becoming more of a social norm.
Some developments, for example of out-of-town
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supermarkets and hospitals, seem to reinforce
these trends.
A group that is commonly identified as
particularly vulnerable is low-income drivers in
rural areas, who are particularly sensitive to
price increases, but have fewer transport
alternatives than people in urban areas. Only 41
per cent of low-income households (the bottom
two quintiles) own cars, but 57 per cent of low-
income households in rural areas own cars
(Skinner and Fergusson, 1998). Low-income car
owners tend to spend less on fuel: 78 per cent of
the average, and they drive 77 per cent of the
average number of miles. Low-income drivers
in rural areas drive 22 per cent further than
other low-income drivers on average. They
drive 94 per cent as many miles as the average
among all drivers.
As with household energy and water use,
decisions about what would be the best policies
to pursue to reduce the environmental impact of
transport without causing negative impacts on
poorer households depend heavily on political
judgements. Unlike household energy and
water use, and as shown by the statistics above,
motoring is not (yet) an essential need for most
poor people in the UK. Measures that increase
the cost of motoring are progressive, not
regressive, on average. Concern about negative
impacts of increased motoring costs on low-
income households has therefore been about the
impact on the minority of these households who
own cars, and has often been expressed in terms
of exacerbating social exclusion (e.g. Lucas et al.,
2001).
A similar, if less pronounced, issue arises
with taxation of air travel. People on low
incomes travel relatively infrequently by plane.
The relatively rich account for the great majority
of air travel. Moreover, the negative impacts of
climate change will be felt mostly by very poor
people in developing countries. Arguments that
we should not impose any restrictions on
people’s freedom to drive or fly out of concern
for social justice miss this wider perspective.
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to ask that policies
to reduce the environmental impact of transport
should not disproportionately impact low-income
households, as discussed in the next section.
Approach
The research in this component of the project
examined a number of options for the future
taxation of cars and their use that have been
under discussion in recent years. The rationale
is that charging can be used to create economic
disincentives for car use. The focus of the
research was the distributional effects of such
measures and how to prevent regressivity. The
options investigated were:
1 increasing fuel duties and abolishing
vehicle excise duty (VED)
2 increasing fuel duties and using the
money to subsidise public transport
3 increasing fuel duties and using the
money to increase benefits
4 reform of graduated vehicle excise duty
(VED)
5 introducing a graduated car purchase tax
6 congestion charging
7 introducing domestic tradable quotas
(DTQs).
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The last of these options, DTQs, focuses
directly on carbon emissions rather than on
motoring charges. With DTQs, each individual
would be provided with an annual allowance of
carbon emissions. Those who emitted more than
their quota would have to buy additional rights
from those who produced less. DTQs could
apply to all direct carbon emissions, from use of
domestic energy, motoring and air travel.
Results
Increasing fuel duties and abolishing vehicle
excise duty (VED)
The distributional impact of increasing fuel
duties and abolishing VED was examined in
some detail by Skinner and Fergusson (1998).
Sixty-eight per cent of all households and 41 per
cent of low-income households owned cars, but,
in rural areas, 80 per cent of all households and
57 per cent of low-income households owned
cars. Low-income drivers would on average be
better off if there was a shift from VED to fuel
taxation because they spent 78 per cent of the
average figure on fuel and drove 77 per cent as
much distance. However, rural low-income
motorists on average spent 90 per cent of the
average on fuel and drove 94 per cent of the
average distance for all motorists. Skinner and
Fergusson calculated that reducing or
abolishing VED would on average benefit even
rural low-income motorists, although, because
of the variation in fuel used, a minority of low-
income motorists would have lost out. From
figures from the 2000–01 Family Expenditure
Survey, it can be calculated that about 30 per
cent of low-income motorists (those in the
lowest four deciles), about 17 per cent of
motorists in the lowest two deciles, would have
been losers. The proportion of rural low-income
motorists who would have been losers would
probably be nearly half.
Increasing fuel duties and using the money to
subsidise public transport
When the Chancellor of the Exchequer froze
fuel duty in 1999, he promised that any future
increases would be hypothecated into transport.
An analysis of the distributional impact of
putting the money into subsidies for public
transport was done using data from the Family
Expenditure Survey 2000–01. It was assumed
that a carbon tax equivalent to £10 per tonne of
carbon dioxide (the effective standard rate of the
Climate Change Levy for companies) would be
imposed. The tax would raise approximately
£633 million per year. Before any compensation
measures, it may be assumed that all of the 72
per cent of households with at least one car
(DfT, 2003a) would be worse off.
If the revenues were redistributed into
subsidies for buses and coaches (which poorer
people tend to use more than trains), the 63 per
cent of households in the bottom quintile (the
bottom two deciles) that do not have a car may
be assumed to be gainers to the extent that they
use buses and coaches. In particular, the subset of
these households that use buses and coaches
tend to gain heavily at the expense of the rather
larger number of households that rely entirely or
almost entirely on their cars. Overall the results
are progressive (the poorest households are
about £20 per year better off), but the fact that
essentially all the households even in the poorer
deciles that have cars lose out means that the
measure does not address the objection raised to
increasing fuel duties: that it would adversely
affect car-dependent poorer households.
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Increasing fuel duties and using the money to
increase benefits
The research then investigated whether it would
be more effective to use the revenues to increase
benefits instead of subsidising public transport.
Targeting benefit assistance at motorists only
would be undesirable because it would create a
perverse incentive to buy a car. Targeting
assistance at people in rural areas would be
strange because, in other ways, their cost of
living is lower than for people in urban areas.
Here the effect has been examined of using the
revenues from the carbon tax on petrol and
diesel described above to increase means-tested
benefits.
When the carbon tax is applied without any
compensation measures, households in higher-
income deciles pay more in absolute terms, but
not significantly more as a proportion of their
incomes, and Decile 10 pays less
proportionately than the rest.
Using the £633 million of revenues from the
carbon tax to increase means-tested benefits
reduces the number of losing low-income
households from 42 to 17 per cent, although
about 47 per cent of low-income motorists, and
about 36 per cent of motorists in the lowest two
deciles, remain losers. Very few (0.3 per cent in
Decile 1) lose out by a large amount, though.
However, increasing benefits is less effective
than abolishing VED at compensating low-
income drivers (where only 17 per cent of
motorists in the bottom two deciles were losers,
see above), although it is of course more
progressive overall because it also helps the
majority of those on low incomes who live in
households without a car. Another problem is
that the low-income households that remain
losers are likely to be those that are most car
dependent. The particular concern that is not
addressed by this approach is about poorer
motorists living in rural areas where there is
little public transport and it is necessary to
travel long distances.
It could also be argued that using the
revenues in this way is not very efficient.
Nonetheless, the exercise shows that benefits
could be used to largely offset the negative
effects of such a tax increase on the poorest
households.
Reform of graduated vehicle excise duty
(VED)
VED graduated according to carbon dioxide
(CO2) emissions was introduced in 2001. For
cars first registered before 1 March 2001, the
VED rates are £110 for cars up to 1,549 cc and
£165 for cars over 1,549 cc. The system for cars
registered on or after 1 March 2001 is related to
CO2 emissions and varies from £65 (£75) for the
most efficient petrol (diesel) cars, to £160 (£165)
for the least efficient (although the maximum
rate is only 185 g/km, which does not
distinguish between ordinary family cars and
those with an engine size of more than two
litres, so there is no really strong disincentive to
buy ‘gas guzzlers’ such as four-wheel-drive
vehicles). The difference in rates of VED is
therefore presently very small in relation to the
purchase cost of new cars and so unlikely to
make any significant impact on buying
decisions. Increasing the rates would at present
make little difference to poorer households
because few of them own post-2001 cars, but
over time it would have an impact.
VED could be more effectively related to
CO2 emissions by replacing the bands that
currently exist with a more graduated system
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along the lines of the reform to company car
taxation made in 2002. If VED started at the
present lowest rate for any car with emissions
below 100 g/km and then increased by £5 for
every additional 5 g/km then the amount of
VED paid would remain almost exactly the
same until a car had emissions above 200 g/km.
Under such a scheme, the present cap on VED
for ‘gas guzzlers’ would be removed. About 6
per cent of cars owned by low-income
households have an engine capacity above 2,000
cc, compared to about 8 per cent of cars owned
by all households (Skinner and Fergusson,
1998), so that the impact on poorer households
of increasing the rate for the largest cars would
be not dissimilar in absolute terms to its impact
on car owners as a whole, while proportionally
it could be greater. However, it is not clear that
arguments based on ‘need’ apply to vehicles of
this size.
Introducing a graduated car purchase tax
The UK had a Special Purchase Tax on cars until
its abolition in 1992. Many other European
countries have a purchase tax on cars. Low-
income motorists buy very few new cars, but
changes in the price of new cars are rapidly
reflected in the second-hand market, so a
graduated purchase tax would also increase
costs for low-income motorists unless
compensating measures were taken. The way to
compensate for a graduated car purchase tax
would be to reduce or abolish VED. The buyers
of second-hand cars have at most a small and
indirect impact on the make-up of the car fleet.
It is the buyers of new cars who choose the cars
that will be on the roads for the next decade or
so, even though new car buyers own the cars for
only a few years themselves. Replacing VED
with a car purchase tax graduated according to
carbon dioxide emissions would mean that
buyers of new cars would be faced with a
significant direct incentive to choose more
efficient vehicles. It would have much more
effect on car purchasing decisions than VED
because the equivalent of about 14 years of VED
for the average life of a car (Burnham, 2001)
would be included in the sticker price of new
cars and the variation in tax between models
would amount to hundreds of pounds paid up
front. The change could not be made overnight,
as it would distort the market for new and used
cars, but it could be brought in with incremental
increases in the car purchase tax and
compensating reductions in VED for cars first
registered in that year over a period of about
five years.
However, a graduated car purchase tax
would not have much effect on vehicle use. It
will encourage people to buy more fuel-efficient
cars, but not discourage them from driving.
Eriksson (1993) concluded that a combination of
carbon taxes and a purchase tax based on
carbon dioxide emissions was the best way to
reduce emissions, as car buyers substantially
underestimate the cost of fuel in their
purchasing decisions.
Congestion charging
In the last few years, the major focus for
discussion in the area of motoring taxation has
been congestion charging, which is the most
sophisticated approach to the spatial
consequences of traffic growth (although it is
not as effective as fuel duty at reducing carbon
dioxide emissions). Congestion charging can
vary the charge according to the expected
driving conditions at any given time or place. It
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can also be used to target urban motorists who
have the most possibility to travel by public
transport instead. The attention on congestion
charging has intensified with the perceived
success of the congestion charging scheme
introduced to central London. The revenues
raised from this congestion charge are used to
pay for improvements to public transport. The
Institute of Fiscal Studies tried to work out what
the London congestion charge would cost
households with differing earnings, using
(rather dated) behaviour patterns from the 1991
London Area Transport Study and assuming no
change in travel patterns as a result of the
charge. The average charge as a percentage of
income was about 0.1 per cent for most of the
lowest two deciles, it peaked at nearly 0.5 per
cent in the fifth decile, just below the middle of
the income distribution and then fell to between
0.3 and 0.4 per cent in the upper half of the
income distribution (Crawford, 2000).
Nonetheless, the outcome was basically
progressive.
The case for a nationwide system of road
charging with satellite tracking of vehicles using
the Global Positioning System was put forward
strongly in a report by the Commission for
Integrated Transport (CfIT, 2002). Drivers would
be charged for travelling on busy roads at
different rates according to the road and the
time of day, but travel on uncongested roads
would remain free. Although CfIT did not
model the actual distributional effects of their
nationwide road-charging scheme, it can be
deduced that a revenue-neutral congestion-
charging system would lead to a redistribution
of money from urban drivers to rural drivers. If
revenue neutrality was achieved by reducing
fuel duty then essentially all urban drivers
would lose and all rural drivers would gain.
That would be the case for both richer and
poorer motorists. If, instead, revenue neutrality
was achieved by abolishing VED then low-
mileage/off-peak urban drivers would
generally pay less in congestion charges than
they would gain, but high-mileage/peak-time
urban drivers would generally lose and rural
drivers would still gain.
A relatively small congestion charge that
was compensated for with the abolition of VED
would cut congestion significantly, but it would
reduce traffic and carbon dioxide emissions by
only 5 per cent at most (CfIT, 2002), equivalent
to a couple of years’ traffic growth. As Foley and
Fergusson (2003) argue, a congestion charge
would need to be revenue raising in order to
tackle traffic growth. The revenues that it would
be necessary to raise to prevent traffic growth
are substantial, of the same order of magnitude
as the government spends on transport at the
moment (Foley and Fergusson, 2003). A
revenue-raising congestion charge would mean
that virtually all urban motorists would lose,
although rural motorists would be only
marginally affected. However, demand for
public transport in urban areas would rise,
requiring the investment of at least some of the
revenues. If VED was reduced to compensate
for the congestion charge, demand for public
transport in rural areas would fall, as motoring
would become cheaper there, making people in
rural areas even more car dependent than they
already are.
Abolition of VED to compensate for
congestion charging would be progressive
overall because, on average, poorer motorists
drive rather less than the average for all
motorists. The poorer rural motorists who drive
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nearly as much as the average for all drivers
would certainly gain because congestion
charging would not affect them for most of their
driving, but it would have a negative impact on
a significant number of poorer urban motorists
who drive at peak times.
Reducing fuel duty in order to compensate
for the introduction of congestion charging
would actually increase traffic overall, because
the increase in rural areas would outweigh the
reduction in congested urban areas, and have
negative environmental consequences (Foley
and Fergusson, 2003). It would also increase the
car dependence of society, particularly in rural
areas, further increasing the social exclusion of
the poorest and most marginalised members of
society (who do not have cars). It would also
tend to make poorer urban motorists lose out,
although poorer rural motorists would gain.
Domestic tradable quotas (DTQs)
The idea of domestic tradable quotas (DTQs) is
rather different from the other schemes
proposed. It does not take road travel in
isolation, but instead looks at all the direct
carbon dioxide emissions of households. The
idea behind DTQs is that every adult resident
would receive for free an equal number of
carbon units to cover their annual carbon
emissions, including private transport.
Businesses and other organisations would have
to buy their quota from government. Those who
used less than their entitlement could sell their
surplus units to others who needed more
(Fleming, 1998).
First, the distributional effect of a DTQ
system that provided each individual with an
allowance based on the average carbon
emissions from domestic energy, petrol and
diesel was examined. Emissions from trains,
buses and aviation were not included. Since
carbon emissions from cars are fairly
progressive (meaning that low-income
households produce proportionately less carbon
emissions in relation to their income than richer
households), while carbon emissions from
domestic energy are regressive (meaning that
low-income households produce
proportionately more carbon emissions in
relation to their income than richer households),
it is not clear what the overall effect of issuing
DTQs in these areas would be.
An issue that arises is the treatment of
children. The proposal modelled here compares
a scheme with adult-only DTQs with one in
which each child also receives a quota of half
the adult amount that would be administered
by their parents. For the sake of example, it is
assumed that the value of a tonne of carbon
dioxide on the quota market would be £10 per
tonne.
The results show that there is not much
difference in the outcomes of the two methods
in terms of the percentage of each decile that
gains or loses, although quotas for children do
lead to fewer losers in the bottom decile. Four to
5 per cent of Decile 1 households lose more than
£1 per week. The difference is mostly in which
households gain or lose, rather than how many
gain or lose at each income level. Quotas only
for adults favour households without children
over those with children (so that 52 per cent of
households with children lose out). Quotas for
children as well favour households with
children over those without (so that only 37 per
cent of households with children lose out).
The objection to providing quotas for
children is that it might encourage people to
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have children in order to get a bigger carbon
quota. However, not providing quotas for
children would be politically controversial,
particularly in the light of government concern
about child poverty and the fact that small
children are especially susceptible to the health
effects of low indoor temperatures. On the other
hand, not providing quotas for children allows
larger quotas for each adult, which helps
another politically important and sensitive
group, pensioners (37 per cent of pensioner
households are losers from the with-child quota
scheme, compared to 31 per cent from the
without-child quota scheme).
About 30 per cent of the poorest households
(bottom two deciles) lose out if only domestic
and motor fuel are covered under DTQs. Flying
is the other major source of greenhouse gas
emissions that could be directly accounted for.
People on low incomes fly very little, while
people on high incomes fly a great deal. The
relationship is strongly progressive. Bringing
emissions from aviation into the equation
would not only make the effect of DTQs more
progressive, it would also do something to
restrict the extremely rapid growth in emissions
from aviation that is currently unchecked
because international aviation is not covered
under the Kyoto Protocol and the UK
government’s Climate Change Programme.
The distributional impacts were calculated
for both without- and with-child quotas, and the
results show that, although including aviation
makes the measure even more progressive,
about a quarter of the poorest households still
lose out (compared to about 30 per cent when
aviation was not included). The number in
Decile 1 losing more than £1 per week has
dropped to 3–4 per cent. However, including
aviation has not had such a large effect in
making DTQs more progressive as might have
been expected.
Lumping together emissions from domestic
energy, motoring and air travel in a DTQ system
does not therefore appear to be the best
approach from the point of view of concern
about the impact on the poorest households. As
discussed in Chapter 2, many low-income
households live in older properties that would
be expensive to bring up to proper standards of
energy efficiency. The emissions that they create
to keep warm are for a basic need. By contrast, it
is hard to argue that flying away on a foreign
holiday is a basic need.
Finally, a DTQ scheme is considered that
applies only to greenhouse gas emissions from
motoring and aviation. The results show that
substantially fewer households in the bottom
two deciles lose out from this option – less than
15 per cent in the adult-only scheme, compared
to about 25 per cent when domestic energy was
included, while only 2 per cent lose more than
£1 per week. Allowing quotas for children is
more progressive still. A DTQ scheme for
transport would therefore appear to be a way of
putting a cap on carbon emissions from this
source with results that are very progressive
overall and include very few significant losers
from households with the lowest incomes.
Conclusions
Decisions about what would be the best policies
to pursue to reduce the environmental impact of
transport without causing negative impacts on
low-income households depend particularly
heavily on political judgements. Unlike
domestic energy, water and waste disposal,
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motoring is not yet an essential need for most
poor people in the UK. Nearly a third of
households do not have a car and nearly two-
thirds of households in the poorest quintile are
without one. Measures that increase the cost of
motoring are progressive, not regressive, on
average. Concern about negative impacts on
poorer households has therefore been about the
impact on the minority of such households who
own cars. The same issue arises with taxation of
air travel, which is undertaken far more
frequently by richer people. The concern
addressed in this section is that policies to
reduce the environmental impact of transport
should not disproportionately impact poorer
households.
Table 7 summarises the results of the various
tax/compensation options for both reducing
CO2 emissions and limiting the effects on low-
income households or motorists.
It can be seen that, if fuel duties are
increased, the most effective of the three ways in
terms of compensating low-income motorists
would be to abolish VED. Increasing benefits
would also have an effect, but not as much,
while using the money to subsidise public
transport would have almost no effect because
households that have cars generally use public
transport very little. However, if the aim is to be
progressive, then increasing benefits is best
(although this benefits non-motorists as well as
motorists), subsidising public transport is next
best (because the poorest are more likely to use
public transport than have a car) and abolishing
VED is least good. The particular concern about
increasing fuel duty is that it would have a
negative effect on poor motorists in rural areas.
People who live in rural areas tend to drive
further and use more fuel than those who live in
urban areas.
Of the various charging or taxation methods
examined, VED is currently the least effective in
restraining carbon emissions, notwithstanding
its recent reformulation so that duty rates now
reflect fuel efficiency. VED could be made more
environmentally effective by increasing the rates
or by allowing the rates on the least fuel-
efficient cars to increase to reflect their greater
carbon emissions. A higher rate of VED for ‘gas
guzzlers’ would have little effect on poor
households, as few own such large, fuel-
inefficient vehicles.
From an environmental point of view, it
would be more effective to replace VED by a
purchase tax graduated according to CO2
emissions. A significant difference in purchase
price between low- and high-carbon vehicles
would be likely to influence purchase decisions
more than when the payments are spread out
over a number of years. Abolishing VED was
also identified as the most effective way to
compensate for congestion charging and would
benefit low-income rural motorists, and low-
income motorists overall, although peak-time,
low-income urban motorists could lose out.
In general, subsidies for public transport are
an ineffective method of compensation for low-
income motorists because most households that
have cars hardly use public transport, but the
experience in London shows that congestion
charging can lead to a shift towards public
transport when it is an easy alternative. A way
to try to reduce the impact on low-income
motorists would be to vary the size of the
charge according to the size of the vehicle,
although it would have only a limited effect
because low-income motorists on average drive
only slightly smaller vehicles than richer
motorists. It is difficult to see how to restrain
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traffic growth through congestion charging
without having some impact on low-income
urban motorists.
As an alternative to taxation, emissions from
households’ transport and energy use could be
limited through the use of DTQs. The research
here shows that over two-thirds of households
in the bottom two deciles, and nearly two-thirds
of all households with pensioners and children,
would be made better off through a DTQ
system involving motoring and household
energy use that gave children half the adult
quota. The percentages increase to around 90
per cent if the DTQs do not include household
energy but do include motoring and aviation
(reflecting the greater involvement of high-
income households in these activities), except
for households with children, where the
percentage falls to 55 per cent.
The main conclusion from this research is
therefore that a system of DTQs covering
motoring and aviation would be an efficient and
progressive way of controlling carbon emissions
from these sources. In their absence, and in a
political context that is unfavourable for
increased fuel duties, at least partly because of
their impact on low-income motorists, revenue-
raising congestion charges could be used to
control traffic growth and hence emissions, with
low-income motoring households being
compensated through the abolition of VED and
further compensation being given, if desired,
through the benefits system.
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Background
This component of the research examined the
possibilities for and implications of variable
charging for household waste in the context of
the UK’s poor record of recycling and waste
reduction or minimisation.
According to the Strategy Unit (2002),
household waste production in the UK is
growing at a rate of 3 per cent a year, exceeding
the rate of growth of GDP. Until recently, waste
policy was afforded little attention at either a
national or local level in the UK. The UK has
historically relied upon landfill as its primary
waste-disposal option. Compared to most other
industrialised countries, the UK has a poor
record on developing alternatives to landfilling
and on recycling.
Factors underpinning the UK’s poor
environmental performance on waste include
the ready availability of cheap landfill sites,
weaker regulatory controls and the absence of
incentives for recycling, low public awareness
and an inability or unwillingness on the part of
many local authorities to invest in more
expensive recycling and waste-disposal options.
However, recent developments in national
policy are now beginning to feed through to the
local level and, with further changes in the
pipeline, these will increasingly impact on
individual households and consumers over the
next two to three years.
A major driver of these changes in the area
of waste management is a number of European
directives, principally the 1999 Landfill
Directive. This requires the UK to reduce the
tonnage of biodegradable waste going to
landfill to 75 per cent of its 1995 level by 2010,
50 per cent by 2013 and 35 per cent by 2020. The
UK is not currently on track to meet the targets
set in the Directive. Although the proportion of
municipal waste sent to landfill declined from
84 per cent in 1996/97 to 78 per cent in 2000/01,
the amount landfilled actually increased from
20.6 million tonnes to 22.1 million tonnes
(DEFRA, 2001). The total amount of municipal
waste continued to rise to an estimated 29.3
million tonnes in England in 2002/03 compared
to 28.8 million tonnes in 2001/02, an increase of
1.8 per cent. However, the amount recycled
increased, from 13.6 per cent in 2001/02 to 15.6
per cent in 2002/03, and the proportion
disposed of in landfill decreased from 77 per
cent in 2001/02 to 75 per cent in 2002/03. This
meant that, for the first time in recent years, the
actual tonnage of municipal waste disposed of
in landfill also decreased slightly from 22.3
million tonnes in 2001/02 to 22.0 million tonnes
in 2002/03 (DEFRA 2004b).
A new waste strategy for England (Waste not,
Want not: A Strategy for Tackling the Waste
Problem in England) was proposed by the
Strategy Unit at the end of 2002 (Strategy Unit,
2002). The Strategy Unit (SU) proposed a
number of targets related to waste reduction
and increased recycling, and recognised the
need for a comprehensive framework of
economic and regulatory measures to ensure
that these objectives were met. It pointed out
that householders currently pay the same
Council Tax no matter how much waste they
produce or whether they recycle or not. Some
local authorities in many other industrialised
countries have variable charging for household
waste. The SU report suggested Council Tax
discounts or reward schemes for people who
compost or recycle regularly, or variable
charging where households pay according to
5 Household waste generation
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the amount of unrecycled and unsorted waste
they produce.
The SU also calculated that, however the UK
disposes of its waste in the coming years, and in
the absence of waste-reduction measures, waste-
disposal costs are likely to double to £3.2 billion
by 2020. The increase will be much greater if the
landfill tax increases from its current rate of £14
per tonne (for active waste) to £35 per tonne in
the medium term, as announced by the
Chancellor in the 2003 Budget.
The SU’s strategy involved reducing the rate of
growth in waste, 45 per cent recycling, 10 per cent
incineration, 20 per cent mechanical biological
treatment (MBT) and other recovery technologies,
and 25 per cent landfill. The present mix is about
80 per cent landfill, 10 per cent incineration and 10
per cent recycling. The SU estimated that the cost
of implementing the strategy would be only about
10 per cent greater for local authorities than the
costs of continuing present waste-disposal
practices and trends over the 18 years to 2020
(£29.6 billion versus £26.7 billion).
Access to appropriate composting and
recycling facilities is a key issue for consumers.
In particular, it has been shown that access to
kerbside recycling facilities is a major
determinant of household recycling behaviour
(Resource Recovery Forum, 2002). Recycling
behaviour varies with household income, with
the affluent more enthusiastic about recycling,
while members of socially excluded groups are
more likely to belong to the 10–15 per cent of the
population who say they would not recycle in
any circumstances (MORI, 2002). The local
authorities with the highest recycling rates are
among the least socially deprived, while the
authorities with the lowest rates are among the
most socially deprived.
Approach
Probably the most effective way of getting
consumers to reduce the amount of waste they
produce is through variable waste charging for
unsorted waste. Under these schemes, people
are charged according to the quantity of residual
(non-recycled) waste they produce. Variable
charging for waste not only encourages people
to recycle, but also makes them more conscious
about avoiding producing waste in the first
place. Variable charging schemes in North
America have reduced the amount of residual
waste disposed of by 15–45 per cent without
any apparent problems of additional
unauthorised dumping (Enviros Aspinwall,
2000). Similar results have been found in Europe
(Eunomia Research and Consulting, 2001).
At present, households pay for waste
collection and disposal through the Council Tax.
Because the Council Tax is regressive, increasing
Council Tax to pay for higher waste costs will
also be regressive. Moreover, the increase in
charges would, like the current flat-rate waste-
disposal charge, do nothing to incentivise
householders either to reduce their waste or to
co-operate with recycling schemes.
The Strategy Unit recommended that local
authorities should be able to introduce variable
waste charging, not least to provide an incentive
for both kinds of behaviour. However, a
potential concern about this is that, like an
increase in Council Tax, it might have a
disproportionate impact on poor households,
because the generation of household waste
bears little relation to income, and more affluent
households tend to recycle more, thereby
reducing their residual waste that would bear
the charge. This was the issue that was the
subject of this research.
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There are essentially four different kinds of
systems of variable rate charging for household
waste.
1 Bag or tag/sticker schemes: the waste
collector only picks up waste that has
been placed in specially identified bags or
containers. Householders may purchase
either special bags or tags/stickers, which
must be fixed to the standard bags or
containers used.
2 Volume-based schemes: householders
choose a waste container or bin of a
certain volume and an annual charge is
based on container volume and often the
collection frequency as well.
3 Frequency-based schemes: householders
choose the frequency of their collection
(usually either weekly or fortnightly) and
pay accordingly. Alternatively, they pay
only when they put out waste for
collection.
4 Weight-based schemes: collection vehicles
are fitted with automatic weight-
recording devices, which record the
weight of the waste collected. Each
household’s bin is fitted with an
electronic identification transponder to
identify it.
The different types of scheme have different
advantages and disadvantages in different
circumstances. A comparison of international
experience suggests that weight-based schemes
are most successful in achieving waste
reduction. In some cases, these have been able
to reduce waste such that their higher cost
compared to the other schemes is more than
offset, so that they become the cheapest scheme
as well as the most effective in changing
behaviour (Eunomia Research and Consulting,
2003). However, this cannot be guaranteed and
there are many factors to be taken into account
in considering which scheme should be
introduced in different circumstances.
If waste charging was removed from Council
Tax by reducing the Council Tax for all
households by the same amount (the average
per household cost of waste collection and
disposal), this would be progressive (i.e. poorer
households would be proportionately better off
compared to richer households).
Because household waste generation is not
related to income, any kind of single-rate
variable charge for waste generation, whether it
is based on bags, stickers, volume, frequency or
weight, will tend to be regressive. For example,
if the waste charge averaged out at £50–100 per
household across the income distribution, this
would correspond in the average household in
the lowest-income decile to 1–2 per cent of their
expenditure, compared to less than 0.3 per cent
in the highest-income decile. For those
households in low-income deciles that
generated more than average amounts of waste,
and had lower than average incomes, the waste
charge percentage of their expenditure would
be much higher. On the other hand, it could be
argued that, if the scheme was structured so that
people could reduce their payments by both
reducing their waste and participating in
recycling initiatives, this would give an
opportunity for low-income people (and others)
to reduce their waste charges.
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Results
Until recently, the only available data on waste
production according to size of household was
from a one-week survey conducted for the
Environment Agency (University of East Anglia
et al., 2000). As would be expected, larger
households tend to produce more waste. One-
person households in the study on average
produced 9 kg of waste per week, two-person
households 13 kg, three-person households 17
kg, four-person households 17 kg and
households with five or more 18 kg. These
averages hide large variations between
individual households and enormous overlap in
the amount of waste produced by households of
very different sizes. The amount of waste
produced by manual and non-manual
households did not vary significantly.
A better and more reliable source of data
became available at the end of 2003. It comes
from a trial by South Norfolk District Council,
using lorries equipped to weigh the waste
produced by around 3,000 households in the
authority. A survey was conducted and
sufficient data was collected on 244 households
for their patterns of waste production to be
analysed.
The 244 households provided information
about the number of members of the household
and the ages of each of them. The households’
Council Tax bands were already known to the
local authority. Information on Council Tax
bands was the only socio-economic variable
collected. Because all the homes were in the
same small area and there was a good spread of
Council Tax bands among the sample, it can be
taken as a reasonable proxy for socio-economic
status.
Table 8 shows that production of total waste
varies considerably between households of the
same size, typically by around a factor of two
between households that produce a little waste
for their size and ones that produce a lot of
waste for their size. Strikingly, one-person
households at the ninetieth percentile (of waste
production) produce more waste (14.8 kg per
week) than five-person households at the tenth
percentile (14 kg per week).
Additional household members lead to
additional waste. The largest change in terms of
both residual and total waste is from a two-
person household to a three-person household,
which seems to add around twice as much to
waste production as an additional person does
above this household size.
Table 8  Weekly production of total waste (residual plus recycled) in kilograms according to household size
in the sample
Number of 10th 20th 80th 90th
people Mean percentile percentile Median percentile percentile n
All households 15.0 8.1 9.6 14.4 20.1 23.0 244
1 9.9 5.6 6.3 9.2 12.3 14.8 36
2 12.7 7.8 8.7 11.5 16.3 19.7 89
3 16.5 9.3 11.6 16.4 20.3 24.8 38
4 18.6 11.9 14.3 17.6 22.6 24.9 55
5 20.5 14.0 14.4 19.4 25.3 29.1 26
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Council Tax band has absolutely no effect on
total waste production in the multiple
regression analysis. If a system of variable waste
charging by weight was introduced for residual
waste and Council Tax was reduced by the
average amount that households pay at the
moment, then, with revenue neutrality and
assuming no waste reduction, the effect on
households of different sizes would be as shown
in Figure 10.
Figure 10 shows that most one- and two-
person households would gain and most larger
households would lose from the simple variable
waste-charging scheme modelled. Although the
proportion of households in each Council Tax
band is particular to South Norfolk and not
representative of the distribution found more
widely, the outcome is a matter of some concern
in terms of the regressive effect for larger low-
income households. One way in which this
concern could be addressed is through the
benefit system.
Figures from Eunomia Research and
Consulting (2003) suggest that the average cost
of household waste disposal to meet the
requirements of the Landfill Directive might rise
from £50 to £70 per household per year, or by
£500 million per year in total, assuming greatly
increased provision for recycling and reduced
waste generation through variable waste
charging. If this increase in expenditure was to
be funded through Council Tax at the same
proportion of local to central government
revenues as at present, central government
would need to fund £375 million (three-
quarters) of the £500 million increase.
The amount of waste that households
produce varies according to size. Figure 11
shows the average amount that households of
different sizes would pay if average waste costs
rose to £70 per year and the charges were per
kilogram of residual waste. On average (and
assuming no waste reduction), one-person
households would then pay £43 and couples
would pay £56. If we assume that they have on
average received a deduction of £50 in their
Council Tax bill, the result is a difference of less
than 15p per week either way.
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Figure 10  Gainers and losers from variable waste charging with no compensation
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One-person households at the eightieth
percentile in their production of residual waste
would pay about £61 per year (i.e. they would
lose about £11 per year) and two-person
households at the eightieth percentile of
residual waste would pay about £77 per year (a
loss of about £27 per year). If there was serious
concern about the impact on households like
these at the upper end of the waste-distribution
curve, there could be an increase of 25p per
single person, and 50p per couple, in Income
Support, Job-Seeker’s Allowance and Pension
Credit, and an increase in Working Tax Credit of
25p per claim. That would cost about £150
million per year.1 However, it is not clear that
this would be necessary, since even most two-
person households would not lose without any
such benefit increases.
In order to protect larger low-income
households, it would be necessary to provide
extra benefits for additional members. As shown
in Figure 11, the average waste bill for a three-
person household would be about £85 per year,
so an additional £35 a year would be needed to
compensate them. The average extra cost for each
of the fourth and fifth members of a household
would be about £12 per year, taking them to an
annual waste cost of £97 and £109 respectively. To
compensate, 50p per week could be added to
Child Tax Credit for all families on benefits and
low incomes. This would cost approximately
£165 million per annum (Child Poverty Action
Group, 2003). If the intention was that no
household below the eightieth percentile would
lose out, then the increase in Child Tax Credit
would need to be slightly higher at 65p per child,
costing about £215 million per annum.
It can therefore be seen that the cost to
taxpayers of protecting 80 per cent of the poorest
households from the additional cost associated
with introduction of such a variable charging
scheme to create a more sustainable waste-
management system, even if they changed their
waste-disposal habits no more than other
members of society, would be about £150 million
for increases in means-tested benefits and £215
million for increases in Child Tax Credit, or about
£365 million per annum in total.
Figure 11  Annual average waste charge per year, with variable waste charging, for households of different
sizes (with an average charge across households of £70 per year).
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It may be noted that, under this scheme,
central government would be spending through
the benefits system about the same as the £375
million it would need to spend in support
grants to local authorities to cover the
additional costs of higher recycling rates, if
these were to be funded through Council Tax. In
reality, without variable charging, central
government, local authorities and ultimately
taxpayers would have to spend far more on
waste management and probably still fail to
meet the requirements of the Landfill Directive
because the growth in waste production is
unlikely to be restrained without it.
The biggest issue raised by seeking to use
the benefits system as a compensation
mechanism is that it works on a national level,
whereas at present it is envisaged that decisions
to implement variable waste charging are likely
to be taken locally. It is in fact not clear why this
should be the case. It could be argued that, once
pilot projects had demonstrated the benefits of
variable waste charging, it could be made a
national requirement. Compensation through
the benefits system for the extra costs for low-
income households, and especially for larger
low-income households, as described above,
would then provide an efficient and effective
means of ensuring that it was not regressive.
Conclusions
Introducing more environmentally sustainable
waste-management practices, as required by the
EU Landfill Directive, is likely to increase the
costs of household waste disposal above current
levels. There are three broad possibilities for
funding these increased costs. Either they could
be funded through Council Tax, either fully or
with the central government paying 75 per cent
as at present, which would be regressive
(especially the full Council Tax option), unless
benefits were increased to compensate for this.
Or they could be funded through general
taxation, by keeping household waste charges
unchanged and increasing the grant from
central government. In both these cases,
household waste generation would seem likely
to keep on rising at 3 per cent per year, so that
waste-disposal charges would double over 15
years, as foreseen by the Strategy Unit report
(Strategy Unit, 2002).
If local authorities were permitted to
introduce variable waste charging, then the
waste-disposal costs of those that did so would
rise less slowly than the charges of those that did
not, because of the incentive to reduce waste
generation. Low-income households could
reduce their charges still further by taking more
aggressive action to cut their waste. Such savings
would not arise if household waste disposal
continued to be paid for through Council Tax. In
due course, it might come to be perceived that
the continuing payment for household waste
collection and disposal through Council Tax was
in fact both inefficient and regressive, and local
authorities be required, rather than permitted, to
introduce variable waste charging.
The analysis in this chapter has indicated
that, once variable waste charging was widely
implemented, the savings to society that it
would be likely to engender from reduced
waste generation would outweigh the
additional cost to the social security system of a
compensation mechanism to ensure that
families on low incomes were not
disproportionately affected by the additional
waste-disposal costs.
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It should be clear for each of the four
environmental issues considered – household
use of energy, water and transport, and
household waste – that the distributional
implications of different systems of charging or
environmental taxation, and the detail of how
regressivity can be mitigated or removed, are
very specific to the issue concerned. The
differences for the different issues have been
rehearsed in the conclusions of each of the
chapters above and will not be repeated here.
This chapter is devoted to the general
conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis
that has been carried out.
The first result that applies to all the issues is
the very limited correlation between the use of
environmental resources and income. The
correlation is non-existent for waste generation
and is very limited for water and energy use. It
is most pronounced for transport, but there are
many low-income households, especially in
rural areas, that own cars. The lesson here is that
environmental taxes and charges will always
need to consider and compensate for their
effects on low-income households if they are not
to have a disproportionate effect on them, i.e. if
they are not to be regressive.
The second general result is that there is a
very wide range of environmental resource use
between households in the same income decile.
In Decile 1 (with lowest incomes), households at
the eightieth percentile use six times as much
energy, emitting nearly four times as much
carbon, and nearly twice as much water as those
at the twentieth percentile. Nearly 40 per cent of
households in this decile own a car. One-person
households at the eightieth percentile generate
nearly as much waste as five-person households
at the twentieth percentile. This variation
between households of broadly the same socio-
economic status makes the design of
compensation schemes very difficult, because,
although on average it is possible to solve the
regressivity problem through either tariff/
charging design or a targeted compensation
scheme, compensation of the average low-
income household will still leave many low-
income households worse off, some of them
significantly so. Compensation of the high-
resource-using households either requires a
degree of targeting that can be administratively
difficult, if not infeasible, or results in very large
redistribution between income deciles (with
most low-income households ending up very
much better off), which is likely to be politically
problematic.
In practice, households will be able to
change their behaviour in response to charging,
reducing the consumption of the environmental
resource in question. This of course is a major
reason for taxing or charging for the resource in
the first place, but this project was not able to
study this issue in any detail. However, it needs
to be remembered that reduced resource
consumption could greatly reduce both the
number and extent of net losing low-income
households from any tax or charging system.
However, the implications of reduced
consumption are very different for different
resources. For energy and water, it could result
in serious health effects. For transport, it could
increase social exclusion. For waste, the
implications seem on the face of it less serious,
but residual waste reduction is crucially
dependent on possibilities for recycling, which
may be limited for poor households in flats or
with less space.
6 General conclusions
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Where reduction in resource consumption
would result in real hardship but the affected
households could be relatively easily identified
(e.g. water use in households with medical
conditions), it should be possible to make
further special arrangements to ensure that this
is relieved. However, where the hardship affects
larger number of households that are harder to
identify (e.g. energy), it may be necessary to
tackle the underlying cause of the hardship (e.g.
energy-inefficient buildings) before pricing is
used as an instrument of policy.
In none of the areas studied will charging be
an adequate policy instrument by itself. A range
of other policy measures will be necessary to
provide alternative services or infrastructure
(e.g. transport, waste), increase capacity (e.g.
energy-efficiency installers) or address barriers
to more environmentally conserving behaviour
(e.g. lack of awareness/information in all areas).
The policy complexity, and the inevitability of
some losers, even in low-income groups, mean
that there is a real danger of governments
opting out of environmental taxes and charges
as they relate to households altogether.
However, this possibility raises again the
issue mentioned in the introductory chapter to
this study, namely that it is very unlikely that
any of these environmental issues can be cost-
effectively addressed without use of the price
signal (and, if an issue cannot be addressed cost-
effectively, this greatly reduces the likelihood of
it being addressed at all). As incomes increase,
households are likely to continue to increase
their use of energy, water and cars unless prices
give them incentives not to do so, or to obtain
the energy, waste or transport services more
efficiently. This suggests that, if the UK, or any
other, government fails to use prices to give
signals for environmentally conserving
behaviour, because of the difficulties involved in
addressing the associated distributional issues,
it will find that the environmental problem will
prove intractable to other policy approaches.
The challenge presented by this conclusion to
the government of the UK, where household
energy is nearly untaxed and energy prices are
relatively low, where water is still largely
unmetered and where household waste-
disposal charges are unrelated to the amount of
waste produced, seems particularly acute.
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Chapter 1
1 It was not the purpose of this project to
rehearse the reasons in principle for
considering the use of economic instruments,
as they have already been given in such
publications.
Chapter 2
1 Deciles by absolute income are often
converted to ‘equivalent income’ deciles to
Notes
take account of differing household sizes.
Further information about this is given in the
working paper (Dresner and Ekins, 2004a).
Chapter 5
1 This and subsequent figures about the
benefits system in this section are
extrapolated from other calculations made by
Holly Sutherland of Cambridge University
for the project team.
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